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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of Myanmar’s political liberalization on 
Sino-Myanmar cooperation from 2008 to 2018. Using a historical comparative analysis 
of bilateral cooperation from the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the 
Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), and the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) years, this thesis indicates that political liberalization temporarily weakened 
Myanmar’s foreign policy with China, which historically has been characterized 
as Pauk-Phaw, or fraternal. The main reasons stemmed from the growth of anti-
Chinese sentiments, coupled with an overdependence on China for economic, 
security, and diplomatic support during the years before liberalization. As a result, 
President Thein Sein and the USDP were inclined to loosen relations with China. 
However, the new democratic regime under Aung San Suu Kyi has re-calibrated 
that trajectory by strengthening bilateral cooperation. China is critical to solving two key 
issues that are of national interest to Myanmar—economic growth and a peace deal with 
various ethnic armed organizations along the Sino-Myanmar border. Also, China 
continues to diplomatically protect Myanmar from international criticisms toward the 
military’s violent oppression of the Rohingya people in Rakhine State. Collectively, these 
factors permit Sino-Myanmar cooperation to endure despite changes in Myanmar’s 
domestic politics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 2010, Myanmar’s rapid move towards liberalization and political reform both 
surprised and perplexed many in the international community. Western countries like the 
United States met Myanmar’s liberalization with a warm welcome.1 For the United States, 
liberalization provided opportunities to counter China’s growing influence with 
Myanmar’s authoritarian military regime, the Tatmadaw.2 U.S.-Myanmar relations 
warmed as the Obama administration lifted financial sanctions, import bans, and, in 2012, 
appointed its first ambassador in over 20 years.3 
China, however, met Myanmar’s liberalization with a more tepid response. 
Whereas liberalization had changed Myanmar’s domestic politics by opening the 
government to public opinion, it also shifted the country’s foreign policies. In 2011, the 
transitional regime under reformist leader Thein Sein reduced cooperation with China in 
response to growing public pressure. In an attempt to win public support, Thein Sein 
suspended the Myitsone Dam, one of the most significant Chinese projects in Myanmar. 
Myanmar’s decision to reduce ties with its largest economic and military provider surprised 
both China and the international community.   
Despite China’s strong economic and military influence, analysts assessed that 
Myanmar was “pivoting away from China”; the government’s recent political 
transformation and warming to the west were the significant driving factors.4 In 2013, 
analyst Yun Sun noted “that Sino-Myanmar relations have been on an abnormal, 
                                                 
1 Yun Sun, “China and the Changing Myanmar,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 4 
(March 28, 2013): 51–77, 53. 
2 Jane Perlez, “In China, Aung San Suu Kyi Finds a Warm Welcome (and No Talk of Rohingya),” 
New York Times, November 30, 2017, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/asia/
china-myanmar-aid-sanctions.html. 
3 Sun, “China and the Changing Myanmar,” 53. 
4 “Myanmar Is Pivoting Away from China,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed November 25, 2017, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/15/myanmar-burma-is-pivoting-away-from-china-aung-san-suu-kyi-xi-
jinping-india/; Mark Magnier, “Myanmar Pivots Uneasily Away from China,” Los Angeles Times, March 
24, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/world/la-fg-myanmar-china-20130324. 
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problematic trajectory since the suspension of the Chinese Myitsone dam in September 
2011.”5 Beginning in 2016, the new democratic regime under Aung San Suu Kyi re-
calibrated that trajectory. Myanmar relations with China did not shift as drastically as 
initially predicted. Instead, bilateral economic and military cooperation with China 
gradually increased. 
This thesis asks the following primary question. Under Aung San Suu Kyi and 
Myanmar’s new quasi-civilian regime, the National League for Democracy (NLD), why 
have Sino-Myanmar relations not shifted as drastically as initially predicted following the 
government’s liberalization period in 2010? In support of the main question, this thesis will 
also answer the following questions. What factors explain changes in the Sino-Myanmar 
relationship before liberalization? To what extent have Sino-Myanmar relations changed 
since liberalization? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Generally described as Pauk-Phaw, or fraternal, Sino-Myanmar cooperation 
experienced unanticipated changes beginning in 2010 because of Myanmar’s political 
transformation and gradual improvement in relations with the West. Liberalization has 
altered Myanmar’s regime, economy, security, and need for diplomatic protection from the 
international community. Therefore, this research question inherently explores the future 
trajectory of Sino-Myanmar relations as a result of Myanmar’s liberalization. Whether or 
not further liberalization produces a weakened, stabilized, or strengthened Sino-Myanmar 
relationship is critical for three reasons.  
First, this thesis seeks to understand whether regime change is the central factor 
that is causing changes in Sino-Myanmar relations–or if other factors are shaping bilateral 
cooperation. Second, Myanmar’s government struggles to balance between public anti-
Chinese sentiments coupled with the need to address two other issues of great national 
interest. These issues include stimulating the country’s stagnant economy and reaching a 
peace deal with ethnic armed organizations (EAO) along Myanmar’s shared border with 
                                                 
5 Yun Sun, “A New Era for China-Myanmar Relations?” The Diplomat, December 9, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/a-new-era-for-china-myanmar-relations/. 
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China.6 In both areas, China is critical to Myanmar’s strategic calculus. Given Myanmar’s 
poor status vis-a-vis China, this case study shows how a weak state can obtain diplomatic, 
economic, and security benefits from a strong state.7 Thus, this research contributes to the 
understanding of how small states deal with China’s rise. Third, the country’s consistent 
human rights violations due to the Rohingya Crisis are forcing Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
NLD to migrate closer to China for diplomatic protection. This research depicts how U.S.-
China strategic competition, despite recent political changes, limits the U.S. ability to 
influence Myanmar on human rights atrocities.8 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the historical evolution and characterizes periods 
of variation in Sino-Myanmar relations since Myanmar’s independence from Britain in 
1948. Additionally, this literature review combines work from notable scholars and 
analysts, David Steinberg, Maung Aung Myoe, Juergen Haacke, Yun Sun, and Bertil 
Lintner.  
According to the literature and from a Myanmar-centric perspective, four driving 
factors underpin Sino-Myanmar cooperation: regime type, security, economy, and 
diplomacy.9 Examining the historical narratives of these factors suggests that bilateral 
cooperation is multi-dimensional. Whereas it is important to note that the changes in these 
factors have produced changes in bilateral cooperation, it is equally critical to know these 
factors are not binary. In addition, the increase or decrease in one or several of these factors 
lead to observable measures of bilateral cooperation. As a result, this thesis attempts to 
measure the shifts of each factor to characterize an increase or decrease of Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation. 
                                                 
6 Stratfor Worldview, “China and Myanmar: Restoring a Damaged Alliance,” Stratfor Worldview, 
August 17, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-and-myanmar-restoring-damaged-alliance. 
7 Juergen Haacke, “The Nature and Management of Myanmar’s Alignment with China: The SLORC/
SPDC Years,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 2 (2011): 105–40, 105. 
8 Perlez, “In China, Aung San Suu Kyi Finds a Warm Welcome (and No Talk of Rohingya).” 
9 Maung Aung Myoe, “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy,” Asian Journal of Comparative 
Politics 1, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 283–98, https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891116637476. 
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The first factor is the characterization of both Myanmar and China’s regime type. 
In this case, a country’s regime type refers to whether the governing regime is authoritarian, 
democratic, communist, or a variation of the three. Conventional wisdom states that like 
regimes are more likely to cooperate while unlike regimes are less likely to cooperate. 
Using this logic, the authoritarian tendencies of Myanmar’s and China’s governments 
enable both to engage and cooperate bilaterally. However, Myanmar’s political 
liberalization has changed its regime type moving from an authoritarian junta to a 
government that is now a “civilian-military hybrid.”10 Therefore, this logic assumes that 
Myanmar’s change in regime type has thus led to changes in Sino-Myanmar relations. 
The second factor is Myanmar’s security. Fraught with decades of internal conflict 
along its borders, the government’s struggle against Chinese-backed EAOs greatly 
contribute to Myanmar’s foreign policy with China. Many of these ethnic groups share 
cultural and ethnic links with the neighboring Chinese in Yunnan province. Historically, 
the increase of Chinese logistical, financial, and armed support of EAOs has led to less 
cooperation and increased conflict in Sino-Myanmar relations. Conversely, as China limits 
its assistance to EAOs, Sino-Myanmar cooperation increases. Therefore, China’s increase 
or decrease of support to EAOs is another critical factor that shapes Sino-Myanmar 
relations. 
The third factor is the Sino-Myanmar economy factor. Critical to the Myanmar 
government’s legitimacy is its ability to stimulate the country’s stagnant economy. 
Myanmar’s reliance on China for “financial assistance and expertise for limited economic 
development” is dependent on two conditions.11 The first condition is Myanmar’s desire 
for international trade. The second condition is China’s ability to supply Myanmar with 
trade and investment. The increase in both conditions results in more cooperation while the 
decrease of both conditions results in less cooperation. In short, the economic factor merely 
is one of supply and demand. 
                                                 
10 Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “Myanmar’s New Leadership And Prospects For Sino-Myanmar Relations – 
Analysis,” Eurasia Review (blog), March 23, 2016, http://www.eurasiareview.com/23032016-myanmars-
new-leadership-and-prospects-for-sino-myanmar-relations-analysis/. 
11 Jürgen Haacke, “Myanmar: Now a Site for Sino–US Geopolitical Competition?” Monograph, 
November 2012, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/Home.aspx., 53. 
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The fourth factor is the diplomacy factor. The more Myanmar requires diplomatic 
support against the West, the more it is inclined to rely on China.12 Conversely, the same 
is also true. Historically, bilateral relations resulted in a higher level of cooperation as 
Myanmar’s need for diplomatic protection increased. Likewise, the less Myanmar required 
diplomatic protection against the West, bilateral relations resulted in a lower level of 
cooperation. Both Myoe and Haacke claim China’s ability to protect Naypyidaw from 
international scrutiny at forums such as the UN Security Council have resulted in close 
bilateral ties.13 
This literature review adopts Steinberg and Lintner’s historical framework to 
identify critical periods in Sino-Myanmar relations and suggests that it will be possible to 
explain changes in those relations in terms of the four factors described above. This 
literature review uses four historical time periods to extract driving factors and significant 
trends that can provide insight into characterizing Sino-Myanmar relations during 
Myanmar’s liberalization beginning in 2010. 
Several scholars and analysts, notably Steinberg, Myoe, and Lintner, tend to agree 
on four main time periods in Sino-Myanmar relations. The first period (1948 to 1962), 
characterized relations as “cautiously cordial but basically friendly.”14 The resolution of 
key challenges along a shared border marked a limited level of cooperation between the 
two countries. During the second period (1962 to 1978), diplomatic ties declined, 
cooperation lessened, and conflict increased along the Sino-Myanmar border. Steinberg 
identifies these years as a “rupture” of Sino-Myanmar relations mainly driven by the 
overspill of the Cultural Revolution across Myanmar’s borders and China’s open and active 
support of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).15 A rapprochement in Sino-Myanmar 
                                                 
12 Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948 (ISEAS–
Yusof Ishak Institute, 2011), https://muse.jhu.edu/book/17996., 108. 
13 Haacke, “Myanmar.” 
14 Bertil Lintner, “Myanmar as China’s Corridor to the Sea,” accessed September 21, 2017, 
http://www.atimes.com/article/myanmar-chinas-corridor-sea/., 3. 
15 David I. Steinberg and Hongwei. Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual 
Dependence, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series; No. 121; Nordic Institute of Asian 
Studies Monograph Series; No. 121. (Copenhagen: NIAS Press;, 2012). 
6 
relations marked the third period (1978 to 1988). As Beijing reduced military and financial 
support to the CPB, Rangoon repaired diplomatic relations, engaged in more cooperation, 
and normalized bilateral ties with China. The fourth period (1988 to 2010) gave rise to 
diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation. Relations strengthened because of 
international sanctions levied on both countries for their crackdowns on pro-democracy 
movements in 1988 and 1989. According to Lintner, Beijing significantly made “deeper 
economic and political inroads into Burma than at any previous time.”16 
1. The Pauk-Phaw Period (1948–1962)
Shortly after Myanmar’s independence from British colonial rule in 1948, the Anti-
Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government under U Nu established diplomatic 
relations with China.17 Although China’s civil war between the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and the Kuomintang had overflowed into Myanmar territory, Myanmar reluctantly 
pressed forward and recognized diplomatic relations with China under the Kuomintang 
(KMT).18 In 1949, the rise of the CCP shifted this relationship and led Myanmar to break 
relations with the KMT and strengthen relations with China’s new government, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Myanmar became the first non-Communist country to 
recognize China’s new regime.19 As both countries continued to recognize the legitimacy 
of the other, Sino-Myanmar ties strengthened.   
The continuation and spillage of the Cold War into Myanmar throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s ushered times of “limited contact and distrust.”20 Several unresolved challenges 
complicated bilateral relations. First, there were territorial disputes along the Sino-
Myanmar border. Second, China’s People Liberation Army (PLA) occupied the disputed 
areas.21 Third, residual KMT forces who had fled China settled inside Burmese territory. 
16 Lintner, “Myanmar as China’s Corridor to the Sea,” 4. 
17 Myoe, “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy,” 288. 
18 Myoe, 288. 
19 Myoe, 288. 
20 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence., 25. 
21 Steinberg and Fan., 8. 
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Collectively, these challenges constituted real security issues influencing Myanmar’s 
perception of China. As a degree of uncertainty began to manifest, the AFPFL grew 
extremely worried about China’s true intentions. As a result, Myanmar’s threat perception 
grew, shaped by the possibility of the PRC’s ability to intervene in Burmese affairs.22 
Both Myanmar’s and China’s drive to resolve these challenges precipitated 
increases in diplomatic engagements. In June of 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and 
Prime Minister U Nu of Burma signed a joint Sino-Burmese declaration “endorsing the 
‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’: Mutual respect for each other’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equal and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence.”23 In 1960, both countries “signed a 
treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression” demarking the Sino-Myanmar border.24  
This treaty both protected Myanmar from Chinese invasion and assured China that 
Myanmar would not accommodate anti-Chinese forces within Myanmar territory.25 The 
Pauk-Phaw years were a period of distrust with limited cooperation because of the security 
challenges that lie along the Sino-Myanmar border. 
During the early years of its relationship, Sino-Myanmar relations were a period of 
mixed relations, with conflict and cooperation, mainly due to territorial and Cold War 
challenges. However, the AFPFL’s and the PRC’s willingness to engage in diplomatic 
cooperation resolved both challenges and led to “nurturing warmer” Sino-Myanmar 
relations.26 Collectively, Steinberg, Myoe, and Lintner concur that overall relations 
between 1948 to 1962 were a period of warm relations. Both countries confirmed their 
commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence and cooperation.27 Whereas 
Steinberg denotes this period as the “Honeymoon Phase” of Sino-Myanmar relations, other 
                                                 
22 Myoe, “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy,” 2. 
23 Bertil Lintner, “The People’s Republic of China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw” (Project 2049 
Institute, May 9, 2017), 6. 
24 Myoe, “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy,” 289. 
25 Myoe., 290. 
26 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence. 
27 Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw., 179.   
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scholars such as Myoe characterizes this period as “warm and cordial…full of exchange 
visits among top government leaders from both sides.”28 This vignette is significant 
because it illustrates the first diplomatic and security engagements between the two 
countries. As a result, this period established a pattern of mutual engagement.         
2. The Rupture Period (1962–1978) 
Scholars see a definite decline of bilateral ties during the second period of Sino-
Myanmar relations. The leading cause was the overspill of pro-communist movements 
across Myanmar borders. In the late 1960s, China’s Cultural Revolution extended into 
Chinese communities in Myanmar. Garnering support for Myanmar’s pro-communist 
party, the CPB, many ethnic Chinese began to openly wear Mao Red Badges – a symbol 
of the Chinese Red Guard.29 In response, the Myanmar democratic government banned 
the wearing of Red Badges leading to the degradation of political relations.30  In 1967, 
anti-Chinese tensions climaxed in Rangoon as Burmese citizens attacked overseas Chinese 
students wearing badges. Unhappy with the oppression of Myanmar’s ethnic Chinese 
population, the PRC began to openly support the CPB with “arms and ammunition, 
financial technical assistance, and workforce.”31 Whereas Myanmar’s domestic challenges 
undoubtedly complicated foreign relations with China, Beijing’s influence within the 
country further aggravated this relationship. China’s influence was a new pattern that 
emerged in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. Indeed, China’s significant influence within 
Myanmar’s internal affairs began to shape the perception of Myanmar’s leaders negatively. 
Myanmar’s economic policy shift to autarky and isolationism under General Ne 
Win was another key driver to the decline of bilateral relations. In 1962 General Ne Win 
overthrew the existing democratic Union Party (UP) government in a military coup leading 
                                                 
28 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence., 41.   
Myoe, “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy,” 290. 
29 Myoe, “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy,” 291. 
30 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence., 8. 
31 Myoe, “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy.,” 291. 
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to a change in regime.32 The change in regime type precipitated a change in its foreign 
policy – which at that time was isolationist. As leader of the new Burma Socialist Program 
Party (BSPP), General Ne Win steered the government with authoritarian rule. Believing 
that the country could thrive independently and be self-sufficient, his policies shifted to 
autarky, or economic isolation, in an attempt to stimulate Myanmar’s impoverished 
economy. As a result, cooperation declined during this period because of Myanmar’s 
isolationist policies, which closed its borders to Chinese trade and investment. However, 
this failed policy propelled the economy into decades of stagnation, which leads to a key 
factor that currently shapes Myanmar’s foreign policy today–Myanmar’s need for 
economic stimulation and foreign direct investment. 
From the Chinese perspective, the Chinese Cultural Revolution also altered 
Beijing’s domestic and international environments. As a result, Sino-Myanmar cooperation 
continued to deteriorate. Domestically, China began to focus on economic growth and 
modernization for solutions to its external and domestic issues.33 Internationally, the 
triangular relationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union shifted with 
Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1972.34 From 1972 to 1975, China re-established and 
improved diplomatic relations with 23 countries, decreasing China’s isolation from the 
international community.35 As China increasingly integrated into the international 
community, Myanmar increasingly segregated itself from the international community 
with its policy of isolation. The result was a divergence between the two countries’ foreign 
policies.  
Steinberg, Myoe, Lintner, and Seekins conclude that the rupture of bilateral ties 
stemmed from two fundamental causes. The first cause was spillage of China’s Cultural 
Revolution intertwined with the PRC’s open and active support of the CPB. The second 
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cause was General Ne Win’s policy preference to pursue autarky and isolationism. As 
Myanmar’s political regime transitioned to an authoritarian government under the BSPP, 
the government re-oriented inward for solutions to stimulate economic growth and 
reconcile the various ethnic armed insurgencies within its borders. In contrast to 
Myanmar’s inward orientation, China sought economic and modernization solutions with 
an outward orientation.36 Although the early 1970s restored diplomatic relations, it was 
not until the late 1970s that Sino-Myanmar relations returned to a level of cooperation as 
China downgraded aid to CPB forces.  
3. The Rapprochement Period (1978–1988) 
From 1978 to 1988, Sino-Myanmar relations improved as diplomatic engagements 
between both leaderships increased. In April 1977, Ne Win visited China to negotiate 
Beijing’s support of the CPB.37 Later the next year in 1978, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
made China’s first state leader visit to Myanmar since the Cultural Revolution.38 Myanmar 
reduced tensions through diplomatic dialogue while China lessened aid to the CPB. As a 
result, the CPB forces weakened. 
The reduction of CPB aid was significant in several ways. First, the weakened state 
of the CPB forces permitted the Tatmadaw to isolate and fragment the CPB to areas along 
the Sino-Myanmar border. The fragmentation of the CPB allowed the military to focus its 
efforts against ethnic insurgencies in other peripheral regions. Second, the CPB’s degraded 
capacity neutralized the existential threat to the Burmese government, thereby shifting the 
power balance and increasing the Tatmadaw’s relative strength. The increase in stability in 
Myanmar’s domestic affairs led to an increase in bilateral cooperation. As a result, during 
this period, Sino-Myanmar relations healed in what Steinberg calls “the renormalization 
period” of the Sino-Burmese years.39 
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 According to Steinberg, the BSPP’s need to stem the flow of Chinese aid to CPB 
forces increased cooperation between China and Myanmar.40 The BSPP perceived China 
as a critical element to resolve Myanmar’s internal conflicts. As diplomatic engagements 
with the PRC increased throughout the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, cooperation 
increased. As a result, General Ne Win’s increased cooperation with China avoided “great-
power competition spill-over” into Myanmar, limited Chinese support for the CPB, and 
allowed the Tatmadaw to focus on areas of regional conflict away from the Sino-Myanmar 
border. The significance of this period was the establishment of another critical pattern in 
Sino-Myanmar relations–the reduction of Chinese support to insurgency forces in 
Myanmar proliferated bilateral cooperation. 
4. The Alignment Period (1988–2008) 
There was an increase in bilateral cooperation during the fourth period of Sino-
Myanmar relations. During this period, the government regime was the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which later changed its name to the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) in 1997.41 In 1988, Myanmar faced a key challenge with 
the 8–8-88 Uprising, resulting in the strengthening of Sino-Myanmar relations. The 
withdrawal in 1987 of all Burmese currency notes, except for the two smallest 
denominations, left the population bankrupt overnight. Hundreds of thousands protested as 
the economy continued to deteriorate. Anti-government protests consisting of students, 
monks, professionals, everyday people, and even children, demanded a new democratic 
government in place of the current authoritarian regime. The military junta moved quickly. 
They used force to suppress the protests, killing hundreds. The military’s bloody 
suppression of the uprising caused the international community to react negatively, 
criticising the junta’s poor handling of human rights and violent, oppressive nature.   
The Tatmadaw’s human rights violations produced two significant effects. The first 
effect was a domestic challenge. The oppression of Myanmar’s population sparked further 
disenchantment with the ruling military government under General Ne Win. The second 
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effect was an international challenge. In response to the general disregard of “human rights 
and civil liberties of the people of Burma,” the United States and western powers levied 
international sanctions on Myanmar, the span of which included “visa bans, restrictions on 
financial services, prohibition of imported goods, new investments, and constraints on U.S. 
assistance in Burma.”42 Faced with both domestic and international challenges, the 
Tatmadaw quickly moved to replace Myanmar’s leadership and government, which began 
to pursue closer relations with China. 
In September 1988, the Tatmadaw responded to domestic pressures of public 
unrest, launched a coup d’état against Ne Win, and formed a new government, the SLORC, 
who “assumed control to defend the country’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and 
unity.”43 Meanwhile, Aung San Suu Kyi garnered popularity and international recognition 
for being a voice for change. Her efforts helped establish the democratic opposition party 
to the junta-led regime, the National League for Democracy (NLD). In 1990, Than Shwe 
and the SLORC proceeded to hold general elections, which the NLD won–receiving “60% 
of the popular votes.”44 The Tatmadaw nullified these results and refused to relinquish 
power. 
The SLORC then proceeded to increase diplomatic, economic, and security 
relations with Beijing. In 1989, roughly a year after the 8–8-88 Uprising, China endured 
similar international criticism in its oppression of civilians during the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre. Thus, as author Ian Holliday mentions, it was only when the “military’s 
repression of democratic protests in Rangoon…was mirrored by the Beijing massacre” in 
Tiananmen were the two states able to converge against global condemnation.45  
As Myanmar’s relationship with the west weakened, the SLORC/SPDC regime 
significantly increased Sino-Myanmar cooperation in the diplomatic, economic and 
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security realms. According to Myoe, the SLORC/SPDC years were a period of “multi-
sectoral linkages.”46 Both Rangoon and Beijing adhered to and entrenched their diplomatic 
actions under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Pauk-Phaw relations. China 
refrained from involving itself in Myanmar’s internal affairs while Myanmar adhered to 
the “One China Policy,” acknowledging that Taiwan was an “integral part of China.”47 
Diplomatically, Myanmar benefitted from China’s role as a “security guarantor” 
considering its international condemnation by western powers.48 In 2006 and 2007, 
challenges from the international community tested Sino-Myanmar relations. In 2006, U.S. 
ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton accused Myanmar of being a regional and 
international security threat, testing Sino-Myanmar diplomatic relations. Arguing against 
Ambassador Bolton’s claim that Myanmar’s domestic situation threatened regional and 
international peace and security, China exercised its veto power arguing that “neither 
Myanmar’s neighbors nor most Asian countries considered the situation in the country as 
posing any threats to regional peace and security.”49 
In September 2007, Sino-Myanmar relations were tested again during anti-
government demonstrations known as the Saffron Revolution.50 The removal of 
government subsidies on fuel caused gas prices to spike and resulted in protests led by 
Buddhist monks. Faced yet again with international condemnation, Myanmar coordinated 
efforts with China to overcome the international pressure of intervention.51 Myanmar’s 
Foreign Minister Nyan Win was sent to Beijing to reaffirm Myanmar’s commitment to 
Pauk-Phaw relations. 
The economic and military growth in Myanmar resulted in Sino-Myanmar 
interdependence. From 1990 to 2000, Myanmar’s economic annual GDP growth rate 
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jumped from a 2.8% to 13.7%.52 Additionally, bilateral trade jumped from US$270 million 
in 1988 to US$4.4 billion in 2010.53 Militarily, Chinese assistance to the Tatmadaw 
increased in the form of arms, equipment, and military capability.54 From 1988 to 2010, 
the Tatmadaw procured over US$2 billion in military hardware.55 China’s military support 
caused a significant power shift in favor of the Tatmadaw against insurgent EAOs, 
resulting in two significant effects on Sino-Myanmar relations. First, military aid to the 
Tatmadaw shaped Myanmar’s perception of China as a friend rather than a threat.56 
Second, stability along the Sino-Myanmar border allowed fluid trade flow between China’s 
Yunnan province and Myanmar. 
In summary, the SLORC under Than Shwe improved bilateral ties with China. 
Scholars conclude that the dominant causes during this era were the regime preferences of 
the SLORC and the PRC, increased Chinese military support to the Tatmadaw, economic 
growth from bilateral trade, and Myanmar’s reliance on China for diplomatic protection. 
In exchange, China enjoyed access to Myanmar’s markets and natural resources, such as 
gas, oil, and jade. The alignment of Sino-Myanmar relations during the SLORC years 
yielded two significant results. The first result was an asymmetric Sino-Myanmar 
relationship, favoring China. The second result, sparked by the first, was a growing 
perception of overdependence on China which began to manifest shortly after 2008. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis analyzes the extent and effects of Myanmar’s liberalization on Sino-
Myanmar relations. To this end, this thesis examines the impact of Myanmar’s domestic 
politics in relation to its foreign policy with China, carefully analyzing the shift of 
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Myanmar’s regime type from a full authoritarian regime to a less than full authoritarian 
regime. However, examination of periods in the literature review offers three other factors 
that may more accurately explain changes in Sino-Myanmar relations. The first driving 
factor was the economic relationship between China and Myanmar. The second driving 
factor involves Myanmar’s internal security and China’s ability to influence ethnic 
insurgencies on the Sino-Myanmar border. The third driving factor was Myanmar’s need 
for China’s diplomatic support from the international community due to the oppressive 
tendencies of Myanmar’s military regime. Therefore, this thesis offers four possible 
explanations characterizing the effects of Myanmar’s liberalization on Sino-Myanmar 
relations. 
In addition, this thesis identifies linkages between the factors, suggesting that the 
factors do not operate in a vacuum. Instead, the factors are intimately intertwined. As a 
result, Sino-Myanmar relations are not only complicated, but they are multi-dimensional 
as well. Therefore, the decrease in cooperation of one factor does not necessarily indicate 
a decrease in foreign relations as other factors may increase cooperation. Indeed, the effects 
of Myanmar’s liberalization may provide a false positive that Sino-Myanmar relations have 
declined. 
1. Hypothesis 1 – The Regime Type Factor 
Myanmar’s change in regime type because of domestic political liberalization 
has led to less cooperation with China.  
This explanation tests whether a more democratic regime will lead to a less 
cooperative foreign policy with China. After the 8–8-88 Uprising, the authoritarian military 
junta of the SLORC/SPDC regime under General Than Shwe increased cooperation with 
China. As Myanmar began to liberalize, analysts observed that the transitional regime 
under Thein Sein reduced cooperation with China, evidenced by the suspension of the 
Myitsone Dam Project in 2011.57 During that time, analysts and scholars assumed that 
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further democratization would lead to even less cooperation. Conventional wisdom states 
this is true. However, it is possible that other factors are more influential in Sino-Myanmar 
relations. This thesis will challenge this argument and identify reasons why Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the NLD are more inclined to increase cooperation with China.   
2. Hypothesis 2 – The Economy Factor
Myanmar’s need for and interest in international trade and investment has led 
to increased cooperation with China.   
Myanmar’s inward focus and practice of autarky under Ne Win and the BSPP to 
fix its stagnant economy resulted in low cooperation with China. As Myanmar’s need for 
trade and investment grew in the late 1980s, and China’s ability to provide trade and 
investment grew, cooperation increased. Civil unrest during the 1988 military crackdown 
signaled to the Tatmadaw that there was an increasing need for economic stimulation. In 
response, from 1988 to 2008 China provided overwhelming economic support to Myanmar 
resulting in more cooperation. Thus, Sino-Myanmar changes have varied according to 
Myanmar’s economic need. Aung San Suu Kyi continues to need economic trade and 
investment driving Myanmar’s need to pursue strong bilateral ties. Therefore, Myanmar’s 
economic need results in more cooperation with China. 
3. Hypothesis 3 – The Security Factor
Myanmar’s struggle to reconcile its peripheral regions and China’s influence 
on ethnic armed organizations has led to increased cooperation with China.   
There is an overwhelming correlation between the support China provides to EAOs 
and bilateral cooperation. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China’s open support of the 
CPB resulted in less cooperation and increased conflict along the Sino-Myanmar border. 
As a result, Steinberg notes that bilateral ties “ruptured.” During the 1970s, the decrease of 
Chinese support to the CPB led to the increase in diplomatic ties, mutual cooperation and 
lessened conflict. As ethnic armed organizations continue to thrive along the Sino-
Myanmar border, China plays an integral role in Aung San Suu Kyi’s desire to reconcile 
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Myanmar’s peripheral regions.58  Therefore, China’s influence over ethnic armed 
organizations explain changes in Sino-Myanmar cooperation.        
4. Hypothesis 4 – The Diplomacy Factor 
Myanmar’s need for China’s diplomatic protection has led to increased 
cooperation with China.    
Myanmar’s need to seek protection under China’s umbrella stems from years of the 
junta’s oppressive tendencies and human rights violations, which has led to international 
criticism and possible intervention. Prominent patterns are evidenced in the mid-2000s as 
China vetoed policies of the United Nations for possible intervention. This factor continues 
to be relative today, mainly due to the oppression of the Rohingya population in Rakhine 
State. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes a historical comparative methodology to analyze why and how 
changes in Myanmar’s domestic environment has led to changes in Sino-Myanmar 
relations. This thesis will examine three periods of domestic transition in Sino-Myanmar 
relations: First, from 2008 to 2010 during the final years of the SLORC/SPDC regime 
under General Than Shwe; second, from 2011 to 2015 during the transitional regime of the 
USDP under the reformist Thein Sein; and third, from 2016 to 2018 during the more 
democratic regime under de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. 
This thesis will utilize books, scholarly journals, think tank reports, news articles 
and speeches by government officials. This thesis will assess the importance of domestic 
politics and regime change in shaping Sino-Myanmar relations. Additionally, this thesis 
will look at the policy choices of each regime with a focus on bilateral trade between 
Myanmar and China, Chinese military support to ethnic armed organizations inside 
Myanmar, and China’s role as a diplomatic protector of Myanmar. 
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The selection of these periods in Myanmar’s history is significant for several 
reasons: first, Myanmar had significant changes within its governing regime; second, some 
clear indicators and triggers show variation in Sino-Myanmar relations; third, the analysis 
of these periods may provide policy implications regarding future Sino-Myanmar relations. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis asks why have Sino-Myanmar relations not shifted as drastically as 
initially predicted since the government’s liberalization period in 2010? In support of the 
main question, this thesis will answer the following questions. What factors explain 
changes in the Sino-Myanmar relationship prior to liberalization? To what extent have 
Sino-Myanmar relations changed since liberalization? This thesis contains five chapters.   
Whereas Chapter I focused on the first sub-question, Chapter’s II and III will focus 
on the second sub-question examining Myanmar’s liberalization period between 2008 to 
2015. These chapters will characterize Sino-Myanmar relations under the last years of the 
SPDC and continue into the transitional regime of President Thein Sein and the USDP 
analyzing the four main driving factors of bilateral cooperation. The goal of these chapters 
will be to explain how domestic and international drivers led to heightened tension and a 
temporary deterioration in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. 
Furthermore, Chapter IV will focus on the 2016 to 2018 years and will characterize 
Sino-Myanmar relations under Aung San Suu Kyi and the newly elected NLD party. The 
goal of this chapter will be to explain how domestic and international drivers have led to a 
rebound in Sino-Myanmar cooperation because of Myanmar’s need for economic growth, 
border stability along the Sino-Myanmar border, and diplomatic support due to the ongoing 
Rohingya Crisis.  
Lastly, Chapter V will summarize this thesis’s main findings, provide policy 
recommendations, and recommend topics for further research. This thesis finds that despite 
a temporary weakening of Sino-Myanmar cooperation during liberalization, bilateral ties 
have rebounded because of the economic, security, and diplomatic benefits China provides. 
As a result, Myanmar’s liberalization did not decrease Sino-Myanmar relations as much as 
initially predicted because of the three other factors involved in bilateral cooperation. 
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II. THE LAST SPDC YEARS: HEIGHTENED TENSION
(2008 – 2010) 
Chapter I characterized the historical nature and driving factors of Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation. Chapter II now examines how domestic challenges during the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Developmental Council’s (SLORC/SPDC) 
final years heightened Sino-Myanmar bilateral tension. The first section describes the 
nature of the SPDC’s foreign policy challenge with China–internal security and economic 
overdependence. The second section then examines four crucial events during this period: 
the growth of Chinese foreign investments and Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the Kokang 
Incident in 2009, and Myanmar’s transition to a quasi-civilian democracy in 2010. Also, 
this section evaluates the impact of these events on bilateral cooperation, paying close 
attention to the role played by the four interconnected driving factors of Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation described in Chapter I: regime type, diplomacy, economy, and security. The 
third section summarizes the findings of Chapter II and concludes by describing the 
challenges the new Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) faced proceeding into 
2011. 
Chapter II finds that during the last years of the SPDC, Sino-Myanmar cooperation 
experienced heightened tension as a result of liberalization. The primary source of 
heightened tension stemmed from two reasons. First, China’s influence over EAOs along 
the Sino-Myanmar border threatened Myanmar’s internal security. This led to an ethnic 
conflict that erupted in 2009. Second, Myanmar’s change in regime type to a “quasi-
civilian” democracy caused domestic turmoil, leading to the development of an 
unanticipated element in bilateral cooperation–anti-Chinese sentiments. Combined, ethnic 
conflict and anti-Chinese sentiments produced heightened tension in bilateral cooperation. 
A. MYANMAR’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA 
In response to the junta’s bloody suppression of the 1988 uprising, western 
sanctions were levied on Myanmar, leaving the country with little international support. 
As a result, the SLORC/SPDC regime leaned heavily on China for diplomatic, military, 
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and economic assistance. Diplomatically, Myanmar looked to China to shield it from 
western states for its unfortunate history of human rights violations.59 To strengthen its 
military capabilities, China supported the junta with defense capabilities estimated at US$3 
billion, a majority of which consisted of training, technical assistance, and military 
arms/equipment to combat EAOs and strengthen its internal security.60 Economically, 
Myanmar benefitted from Chinese trade and investment, which grew significantly in 2010. 
These dependencies led to growing concerns among Tatmadaw leaders. Indeed, the 
increase in Chinese diplomatic, security and economic aid led to an increase in China’s 
ability to influence Myanmar’s economic, political, and social environments.   
Scholarly observers questioned whether Myanmar’s “political independence had 
been compromised by Naypyidaw’s reliance on Chinese support.”61 This perception 
disturbed Tatmadaw elites, leaving Myanmar with a complex foreign policy dilemma–how 
to properly manage Myanmar’s relationship with China while tempering growing Chinese 
influence within Myanmar’s domestic affairs. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
This section focuses on relevant case studies from 2008 to 2010 and examines the 
role played by the four driving factors of Sino-Myanmar cooperation described in Chapter 
1: regime type, diplomacy, economy, and security. Additionally, this section describes the 
conditions and events that influenced bilateral relations to either increase or decrease in 
cooperation. The responses taken by both governments, therefore, measure cooperation.    
1. The Diplomacy Factor – Reinforcing Previous Patterns
Myanmar’s need for diplomatic protection from the international community 
stemmed from the Tatmadaw’s oppressive nature towards its domestic population. As a 
result, Myanmar looked to China for diplomatic support to shield it from international 
institutions such as the United Nations, who criticized the Myanmar government for human 
59 Haacke, “The Nature and Management of Myanmar’s Alignment with China.,” 116. 
60 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations : Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence., 311. 
61 Haacke, “The Nature and Management of Myanmar’s Alignment with China.,” 122. 
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rights atrocities. The events of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 displayed reinforced patterns of 
non-interference, mutual respect, and cordial Pauk-Phaw relations since 1988. Bilateral 
cooperation during Cyclone Nargis illustrated traditional Pauk-Phaw relations as China 
protected Myanmar from international proposals to interfere in Myanmar’s domestic 
affairs as stipulated under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.62 
Due to a lack of foreign assistance, the SPDC was unable to resolve the devastation 
caused by Cyclone Nargis in 2008.63 The cyclone destroyed homes, left thousands of 
refugees, and created a severe humanitarian crisis.64 Roughly 2.4 million were affected 
with over 140,000 victims, and over 800,000 displaced.65 The destruction and flooding of 
important croplands, to include Myanmar’s “rice basket,” and habitats left the population 
in need of food, lodging, and basic assistance.66 Prices jumped as the scarcity of such 
resources increased. It was not until 2010 that the country began to show signs of recovery 
through assistance led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
United Nations (UN).67 By July, ASEAN and the UN surrendered their lead roles to 
Myanmar, who assumed control over humanitarian relief efforts.68 Still, the SPDC 
received worldwide criticism for its “lack of a state-led response” and reluctance to open 
its border to foreign assistance.69 
The events of Cyclone Nargis could not have come at a less opportune time for the 
SPDC and Beijing. For Myanmar, Cyclone Nargis occurred in the midst of the junta’s 
                                                 
62 See Seng Tan, “Providers Not Protectors: Institutionalizing Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast 
Asia,” Asian Security 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 201–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14799855.2011.615081., 207. 
63 Donald M. Seekins, “State, Society and Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (Burma),” 
Asian Journal of Social Science 37, no. 5 (September 2009): 717–37, https://doi.org/10.1163/
156848409X12474536440500., 719. 
64 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Opening up Spaces for 
Advancing Human Security,” The Pacific Review 25, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 113–34, https://doi.org/
10.1080/09512748.2011.632971., 114. 
65 Seekins, “State, Society and Natural Disaster.,” 717. 
66 Seekins., 718. 
67 Tan, “Providers Not Protectors.,” 208. 
68 Tan., 208. 
69 Ashley South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 1 edition (Routledge, 2008)., 225. 
 22 
transition towards a “disciplined-flourishing democracy.”70 For China, the cyclone 
happened amidst its preparations for the 2008 Olympics, a symbolic display of China’s rise 
as a major global power. The chaos caused by Nargis thus presented both countries with 
complex challenges that were exacerbated by international scrutiny. Myanmar’s challenge 
consisted of two parts:  its need for humanitarian aid and, intertwined with the first, the 
SPDC’s unwillingness to allow international assistance to flow across its borders. As a 
result of the SPDC’s fear of international intervention, Myanmar bolstered ties with China 
seeking both economic relief and diplomatic protection from western criticism. 
When the SPDC finally allowed humanitarian assistance to flow across its borders, 
the government did so in a manner to “limit and control the provision of relief” by 
implementing several restrictive measures.71 First, government officials confiscated aid 
upon its arrival into Myanmar, only later to release it.72 Second, the SPDC subjugated 
relief workers to an extensive visa application process, which prevented or prolonged their 
entrance into the country.73 Meanwhile, aid workers inside Myanmar were severely limited 
in movement and tightly controlled.74 Third, the SPDC did little to support aircraft in 
neighboring countries carrying much-needed supplies.75 Likewise, ship vessels sent from 
the United States, Britain, and France to support the relief effort were not permitted to 
port.76 In the end, these actions only frustrated the international community, which 
perceived the SPDC’s response to Nargis as a discredit to the military-led regime. Most 
importantly, it reinforced previously perceived norms of the SPDC’s continuous, 
oppressive nature.77 
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The country’s colonial history and the junta’s ideology primarily framed the 
SPDC’s response to Nargis. There were deeply embedded perceptions of Myanmar’s past 
encounters with foreigners. Colonial experiences with the British throughout the Anglo-
Burmese wars, China’s support of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) throughout the 
Cold War, and international condemnation of Myanmar’s regime throughout the 8–8-88 
uprising amplified a perception that foreign powers destabilized the country through its 
consistent meddling of Myanmar’s domestic affairs. 
A second reason stemmed from the Tatmadaw’s ideology, which was based on the 
“Three National Causes – non-disintegration of the union…non-disintegration of national 
solidarity…and perpetuation of national solidarity.”78 Throughout Myanmar’s numerous 
civil wars and insurgencies, the Tatmadaw had become largely entrenched in Burmese 
politics. As Tatmadaw interests were very nationalistic and patriotic, it was not surprising 
then that the military struggled to limit foreign influence to maintain Myanmar’s state 
sovereignty and independence.79 The combined influences of both past experiences and 
ideological beliefs thus reflected the context of Myanmar’s reluctance to foreign 
intervention. 
While the international community continued to criticize Myanmar’s actions 
towards Cyclone Nargis, China responded both economically and diplomatically to assist 
the SPDC despite preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games. The Beijing Olympics 
signaled China’s emergence as a global world power with an opportunity to showcase its 
maturity as a rising economic and significant political player.80 Economically, China 
elected to bypass the UN and, instead, bilaterally pledged US$5.2 million in humanitarian 
assistance to Myanmar.81 Diplomatically, China protected Myanmar from UN pressure 
and possible sanctions. Accusing the SPDC of committing crimes against humanity, 
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western nations attempted to force their way into the country under stipulations of the R2P 
doctrine. Additionally, France “invoked the R2P to legitimize the forcible delivery of 
humanitarian assistance without the Myanmar junta’s consent.”82 In response, China, 
along with several other countries, such as Russia and South Africa, blocked these steps 
claiming Cyclone Nargis was an “internal matter that did not threaten international peace 
and security.”83 
From the diplomacy perspective, the last years of the SPDC depicted bolstered 
relations between Myanmar and China. With Myanmar’s limited opportunities to engage 
with the international community, China’s economic and diplomatic assistance became 
increasingly apparent during Cyclone Nargis. Whereas bilateral diplomatic relations had 
bolstered, Chinese economic influence among Myanmar’s domestic affairs continued to 
grow. This dependence precipitated tension in the future years of Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation.   
2. The Security Factor – Challenging Previous Patterns 
After appearing to improve during 2008, Myanmar’s relations with China worsened 
in 2009. The leading cause was an increase in conflict between Myanmar’s military and 
EAOs in regions along Myanmar’s border with China. The most important conflict was 
known as the Kokang Incident, which occurred in the northern Shan State bordering 
China’s Yunnan Province. The result of the conflict led to heightened tension and a 
decrease in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. 
Whereas the SPDC’s desire to engage the Kokang was motivated mainly by 
attempts to increase Myanmar’s internal security by disarming EAOs in Myanmar’s 
peripheral regions, a political element also existed. As preparations were being made for 
the upcoming 2010 elections, the SPDC proceeded to retire the senior leaders of EAOs 
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who could form opposition political parties.84 This permanently marginalized those 
wanting to contest the election.   
Meanwhile, in accordance with the 2008 constitution, the SPDC also maneuvered 
to enforce Article 338, a provision that required to “either disarm or transform [EAOs] into 
smaller, lightly armed Border Guard Forces (BGF).”85 As a result, the integration of EAOs 
into BGFs deprived ethnic groups of their limited autonomy. Also, EAOs were required to 
incorporate Tatmadaw officers and soldiers into their units. Weaker EAOs adhered to the 
policy, but several EAOs feared the provision would put them under Tatmadaw control 
and refused.86 In addition, China supported many of these factions, which proved to be 
problematic. Myanmar faced a significant security challenge.   
Several objectors were factions that formerly consisted of the CPB, notably the 
Kokang, the Shan, the Kachin, and the 30,000 strong United Wa State Army (UWSA).87 
The complexity of the situation was muddied by China’s support of the EAOs which was 
“both strong and pervasive, reflecting not merely ethnic kinship ties across the border, but 
also professional and personal relationships of the leadership of the ethnic ceasefire groups 
with authorities in Yunnan.”88 Much of this support took the form of business interests, 
economic support, and arms trafficking.89 Not only frustrated by China’s support but also 
challenged by significant obstacles to national reconciliation and state-building, the SPDC 
mobilized militarily in April 2009 to the northern border areas.90   
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Distrust between the government and EAOs deepened as the SPDC sent troops to support 
a splinter faction, which agreed to the BGF provision, in the northern areas of the Shan 
State. The military’s aggressive move was an attempt to “take advantage of disunity” and 
fragment the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the military arm 
of the Kokang.91 On August 8, 2009, the Tatmadaw engaged the MNDAA as troops raided 
the residence of leader Peng Jiasheng near the Kokang capital of Laogai. The fighting 
disrupted a temporary ceasefire agreement with the EAOs and caused instability along the 
Sino-Myanmar border (see Figure 1). Over 200 were killed or wounded during the Kokang 
Incident. An additional 37,000, to include Peng Jiasheng, fled and sought refuge in 
China.92 
Figure 1. The 2009 Kokang Incident93 
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The Kokang Incident disrupted Sino-Myanmar relations in several ways, sparking 
both military and diplomatic responses from China. Militarily, Beijing dispatched troops 
to the Sino-Myanmar border to protect its sovereignty and citizens.94 Diplomatically, 
envoys were dispatched to Naypyidaw to discuss, ease, and alleviate bilateral relations. 
China’s open public statement of the incident called the “SPDC to properly handle 
domestic problems and maintain stability in the China-Myanmar border region.”95  It was 
clear that the Kokang Incident frustrated Beijing and diverged from previous interactions 
similar to those in 1988. 
Responses from both Myanmar and China were departures from previous Pauk-
Phaw relations. First, Myanmar’s usage of force, despite the consequences in its foreign 
relationship with China, illustrated a prioritization of the SPDC’s national interests over its 
foreign policy. Second, China’s military and public response were unlike previous patterns. 
Previous Chinese public responses had mostly aligned with politically correct rhetoric, 
emphasizing mutual non-interference along with maintaining peaceful coexistence. 
Whereas Cyclone Nargis had indicated reinforced patterns of cooperation, the Kokang 
Incident in 2009 depicted frustrations in Sino-Myanmar relations, particularly with China’s 
support of EAOs. As a result, bilateral cooperation lessened because of heightened tension 
in Myanmar’s internal security factor. 
3. The Regime Type Factor – Changing Previous Patterns 
The effects of Myanmar’s political liberalization spanned over several years, 
beginning with the SLORC/SPDC regime and continuing through the transitional regime 
under Thein Sein and the USDP. During the final years of the SPDC, liberalization changed 
Myanmar’s regime type, going from an entirely authoritarian rule under the Tatmadaw to 
a quasi-civilian authoritarian rule. Whereas Chapter I does not address liberalization as one 
of the four driving factors to Sino-Myanmar relations, the effects of liberalization both 
directly and indirectly affect the factors of the Sino-Myanmar relationship in various ways. 
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As early as 2003, Myanmar had discussed plans to ameliorate pressures of change 
through an orderly government transition and a new constitution.96 Known as the 
“Roadmap to Democracy” and originally used as a delaying tactic by General Than Shwe, 
the roadmap was meant to appease foreign critics and reduce domestic pressures of political 
reform.97 Whereas the adoption of a new constitution symbolized progress of the SPDC’s 
transition from a full authoritarian regime to a hybrid democracy, the constitution also 
entrenched provisions of the junta’s power.98 As the SPDC had no real desires to transfer 
Myanmar to full civilian control, the government proceeded sluggishly to draft a 
constitution which took several years.99  
The events of the Saffron Revolution in 2007, however, accelerated efforts to 
implement the roadmap. Named after the colored robes of Buddhist monks who led the 
political movement, the removal of government subsidies on fuel caused gas prices to spike 
leading the population to protest for a new government. Facing international criticism once 
more, Myanmar coordinated efforts with China to overcome international pressures of 
intervention.100 Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win was sent to Beijing to reaffirm 
Myanmar’s commitment to “domestic stability, national solidarity, and economic 
growth.”101 Internationally, Chinese diplomats moved to water down the direct language 
of the UNSC’s Presidential Statement to the situation.102 Although China once again 
shielded Myanmar from international pressures, China’s bilateral engagements challenged 
Myanmar’s usage of force and violence. It called the junta to exercise restraint in support 
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of the country’s political stability.103 Nevertheless, the protests were put down violently 
resulting in several deaths and hundreds more arrested or detained. 
The events of the Saffron Revolution had once again illustrated a bolstering of 
diplomatic ties in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. However, Myanmar’s decision to use force, 
despite China’s warning to refrain from violence, challenged previous patterns of Pauk-
Phaw relations, indicating that there were indeed limits to China’s diplomatic backing. 
Domestically, the Saffron Revolution had a different effect on the SPDC. It highlighted the 
challenges the regime would continue to face if changes in the authoritarian government 
did not occur. 
In 2008, running parallel to the events of Cyclone Nargis, the government pushed 
to hold a new constitutional referendum.104 Whereas recovery plans for Nargis were still 
maturing, the referendum for an SPDC-backed constitution progressed forward on May 10, 
roughly one week after the cyclone had made landfall on Myanmar’s shores.105 Instead of 
assisting the population along the affected southern coastal areas where the damage was 
most prominent, Tatmadaw soldiers were recalled to prepare for the voting polls.106  
Individuals were given ballots pre-marked “yes.”107 The voting was clearly fixed on the 
referendum. By the end of May, the referendum had passed by 92.48%.108 The decision to 
release a manipulated draft constitution, especially during a time of national crisis, only 
resulted in further disenchantment of the SPDC regime. 
Politically, China praised the adoption of the 2008 constitutional referendum 
despite international criticism of the referendum as being “undemocratic” and “rigged.”109 
China welcomed Myanmar’s opening to liberalization and encouraged the military junta to 
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continue to progress towards democracy. According to author Myoe, reform was welcomed 
by China; progress towards a more democratic government was seen as “a viable way to 
cool down international pressure for political change in Myanmar.”110 Also, political 
stability ensured China’s economic interests were protected, which began to rise 
exponentially from 2008 to 2010. China understood that the Tatmadaw had been seeking 
avenues to eliminate its pariah status. As such, China’s response to liberalization aligned 
with its Pauk-Phaw tradition of mutual non-interference under the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence. China supported Myanmar’s effort “to promote good governance, 
political transition, and national reconciliation.”111 
The 2010 elections became the apex of the military junta’s roadmap towards 
“disciplined democracy,” leading to several political and social changes in Myanmar. 
Politically, the elections installed a “nominally civilian government” that was largely 
perceived to be a façade for the Tatmadaw’s continuous rule.112 Socially, the government 
began to open to influences of public opinion. Nevertheless, despite blemishes of 
“widespread instances of intimidation, fraud, and other irregularities,” these elections were 
the first held in 20 years, garnered the usage of voting polls, and set the framework for the 
2015 elections.113 The elections produced a transition from a full authoritarian rule to a 
quasi-civilian authoritarian rule under the Union Solidarity and Development Party. 
Liberalization served two aims for the military-backed SPDC. First, liberalization 
provided a “veneer of legitimacy” to the ruling generals.114 A historical event that was met 
with great enthusiasm during the following weeks of the election was the release of 
political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi. In October, the country changed its official name and 
flag.115 The prefix “Republic” was added to the “Union of Myanmar” while the flag shed 
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“the socialist era standard” and changed to the present-day trademark of a white star with 
yellow, green, and red horizontal stripes.116 
Second, the creation of a new constitution “enshrine[d] the military’s role in 
politics.”117 Several provisions in the 2008 constitution assured the Tatmadaw maintained 
control and power over the new political system. First, the constitution ensured the junta 
would not be subject to prosecution; as such, they could not be held accountable for past 
wrongdoings.118 Second, the Tatmadaw reserved 25% of parliamentary seats, all 
appointed by the commander-in-chief.119 The percentage ensured the Tatmadaw had 
sufficient veto power in Parliament. Third, individuals were prohibited from holding any 
political office if they were married to foreigners or were previously married to 
foreigners.120 This provision specifically aimed at Aung San Suu Kyi as her late husband, 
Michael Aris, was a British citizen. Fourth, the commander-in-chief maintained executive 
powers over “defense, home affairs, and border affairs.”121 The commander-in-chief also 
had considerable influence in the appointment of the presidents and the two vice-
presidents.122 Lastly, perhaps the most significant was the stipulation that the Commander-
in-Chief reserved the authority to dissolve a civilian government and reinstitute martial 
law.123 The mechanisms embedded within the Burmese constitution permitted, and still 
permit, the Tatmadaw to exert influence over the government while appearing to 
implement political reform. Thus, the transitional government under the USDP was still 
very much a “‘democracy’ guided by military leadership.”124 
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Although ethnic conflict along the Sino-Myanmar border had increased tension 
with the SPDC, China’s response to the 2010 elections remained diplomatic and cordial. 
China welcomed Myanmar’s opening of political space and holding of multi-party 
elections. The spokesperson for the China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hong Lei, 
congratulated Myanmar.125 From Beijing’s perspective, the elections were critical to 
“Myanmar’s seven-step roadmap and transition to a democratic government.”126 
Whereas Myanmar’s domestic population and the international community 
condemned the elections as deeply flawed, China “praised [the] progress as ardently as 
other states opposed it.”127 China’s response stemmed from economic access to 
Myanmar’s natural resources in exchange for diplomatic backing.128 The coupling of 
China’s role as diplomatic protector with economic factors indicated the complex 
intertwining of the four driving factors of Sino-Myanmar relations. Overall, however, the 
effects of Myanmar’s liberalization were beginning to challenge past patterns and change 
the nature of the four driving factors in Sino-Myanmar relations.  
4. The Economy Factor – A New Pattern Emerges 
The final years of the SPDC saw a significant rise in Sino-Myanmar economic 
cooperation resulting in an asymmetric relationship favoring China. Economic cooperation 
stemmed from two aspects. On the one hand, cooperation stemmed from Myanmar’s need 
for foreign direct investment (FDI) to stimulate its stagnant economy. On the other hand, 
China’s rise as an economic superpower during this period led to its need for greater energy 
security. Beijing “regarded Myanmar as a country of considerable geostrategic as well as 
geo-economic significance and business opportunity.”129 The mutually beneficial 
relationship of both countries during this period allowed economic cooperation to increase. 
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Nevertheless, Chinese foreign investment came at a price. Scholar’s widely 
speculated that, in exchange for diplomatic protection and economic aid, the SPDC 
provided China with access to its natural resources.130 In addition, China’s landlocked 
southwest region enjoyed access to the Indian Ocean, allowing China to bypass the 
Malacca Strait for transporting its energy resources.131 As a result, China’s need for access 
to both water and resources initiated considerable energy and natural resource investments 
into Myanmar. 
In 2008, Chinese FDI consisted of less than US$1 billion, making up less than 10% 
of Myanmar’s total FDI (See Figure 2).132 By 2010, however, China’s FDI into Myanmar 
rose to US$8.3 billion, consisting of 93% of Myanmar’s total FDI.133 This notable jump 
came primarily from investments in the Myitsone Dam Project, the Letpadaung Copper 
Mine project, and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines.134 Collectively, these projects 
were valued to be more than US$8 billion.135 
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Figure 2. Chinese FDI in Myanmar (2001–2012)136 
Despite increases in Myanmar’s FDI, China’s extractive behaviors produced severe 
environmental and social effects.137 In the case of the Myitsone Dam, this included the 
submerging of historical sites along the Mail and N’mai Hka rivers, which were widely 
considered to be the birthplace of Myanmar.138 Socially, Myanmar’s vast population did 
not benefit from Chinese businesses and investors; it gave “little regard for sustainable 
development, job creation or technology transfers.”139 In addition, power generated by 
both the dam and oil and gas pipelines flowed back to China, leaving Myanmar’s “extreme 
power shortage” with no solution.140 As a result, the combined environmental and social 
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effects of Chinese investments underpinned the emergence of a new element in Sino-
Myanmar relations–the growth of anti-Chinese sentiments. 
C. ANALYZING THE FACTORS 
This section examined and analyzed the role and impact of the four factors on Sino-
Myanmar relations from 2008 to 2010. Whereas the case of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 
reinforced previous SLORC patterns of Pauk-Phaw relations, the Kokang incident in 2009 
challenged these patterns, which led to lessened bilateral cooperation. Tensions in Sino-
Myanmar cooperation arose from Myanmar’s decision to engage the EAOs despite the 
foreign relation risks from China. Furthermore, political liberalization began to open 
Myanmar’s political space to public opinion making the SPDC increasingly receptive to a 
new element produced by Chinese economic overdependence–anti-Chinese sentiment. 
Combined, the increase in tension in Myanmar’s internal security intertwined with the 
country’s growth in economic dependence resulted in less cooperation as the SPDC 
transitioned to the quasi-civilian government under the USDP in 2010. 
This section also made several observations in regards to the intertwined 
relationship of this thesis’ four factors. First, the four factors do not operate independently 
from one another. The coupling of diplomatic and economic support from China during 
Cyclone Nargis and through liberalization suggests that these four factors are in fact, 
interrelated. Second, throughout different periods of time, one factor was not equally 
weighed against the other. For example, in 2009, Myanmar’s security factor became much 
more important as the Tatmadaw attempted to reconcile the EAOs before elections. 
Likewise, the importance of the regime type factor increased as liberalization continued to 
reform Myanmar’s government. During the SLORC years, the economic factor 
consistently provided evidence of cooperation. However, throughout the last years of the 
SPDC, the economic factor led to increased tension as the growth of Myanmar’s 
overdependence was becoming a point of growing contention. 
Third, liberalization during this period both directly and indirectly affected the 
Sino-Myanmar factors. Directly, liberalization changed Myanmar’s regime type from a full 
authoritarian to quasi-civilian democracy and opened the government to public opinion, 
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which had mainly become anti-Chinese. Indirectly, liberalization affected Myanmar’s 
security factor. Whereas its concern for internal security mainly drove the Tatmadaw’s 
desire to reconcile the EAOs in 2009, there were also political motivations driven by the 
upcoming 2010 elections. As a result, military tension increased along the Sino-Myanmar 
border. The effects of Myanmar’s liberalization had begun to exacerbate already increasing 
tensions in Sino-Myanmar relations. 
D. CONCLUSION         
This chapter looked at the SPDC’s transitional years, examined how domestic 
challenges impacted the four driving factors described in Chapter I and found that Sino-
Myanmar relations entered a problematic phase beginning in 2008. First, the Tatmadaw’s 
desire to reconcile EAOs along the Sino-Myanmar border before elections erupted in ethnic 
conflict in 2009. As fighting ensued between the Tatmadaw and the Kokang, tension 
increased. Second, liberalization opened Myanmar’s political space and led to the 
government’s receptiveness towards public opinion, which had mainly become anti-
Chinese. Collectively, these reasons led to growing tension, and a decline in Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation that progressed as reformist Thein Sein and the USDP took control in 2011. 
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III. THE USDP YEARS: WEAKENED BILATERAL 
COOPERATION (2011 – 2015) 
Chapter II found that the impacts of Myanmar’s liberalization shifted the character 
and nature of Sino-Myanmar cooperation–tensions heightened because of anti-Chinese 
sentiments and increased ethnic conflict. Throughout Myanmar’s transitional years under 
reformist Thein Sein and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), bilateral 
ties continued to degrade, plummeting “to their lowest point for at least three decades.”141 
Chapter III examines the conditions that precipitated the weakening of bilateral 
cooperation. The first section describes the changes of Myanmar’s domestic and 
international environments from 2011 to 2015. The second section then examines how 
liberalization continued to influence the driving factors of Sino-Myanmar cooperation 
described in Chapter I: regime type, diplomacy, economy, and security. This section 
utilizes case studies and evaluates the factors, characterizing changes in Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation. The third section analyzes why these factors remain relevant in setting 
conditions for future bilateral cooperation. The fourth section summarizes the key findings 
of Chapter III. 
This chapter finds that from 2011 to 2015, bilateral relations degraded for several 
reasons. First, relations warmed with the international community. As Myanmar’s foreign 
policy diversified, the country relaxed its dependence on China.142 Second, pressures of 
anti-Chinese sentiments escalated into public protests, which impacted economic 
cooperation. Third, ethnic conflict continued to increase as the Tatmadaw engaged several 
EAOs, which destabilized Sino-Myanmar cooperation along the border. Collectively, these 
events challenged previous Pauk-Phaw patterns of Sino-Myanmar cooperation, leading 
relations to weaken, but not break. 
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A. MYANMAR’S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES 
With the conclusion of “flawed” elections in 2010, President Thein Sein and the 
USDP assumed control of the government, completing the transition to the first civilian 
government in nearly 50 years.143 Politically, the government continued to “systematically 
address the elements of the roadmap, including reconciling pro-democracy groups and 
ethnic minorities.”144 Economically, the government passed reforms in policies such as 
“currency exchange rates, taxation, foreign investment, and anti-corruption.”145 While the 
government continued to implement both political and economic reform, western criticism 
towards Myanmar’s regime gradually relaxed. Furthermore, Myanmar’s changed 
international perception led to opportunities for rapprochement with the West. 
Internationally, Myanmar’s liberalization drove a warming of relations with the 
West, followed by the country’s opening to foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade.146 
Having undergone years of international isolation, the government sought opportunities to 
open the country’s economic environment, alleviate sanctions, and diversify its foreign 
policy.147 As Chinese influence increased throughout the SLORC/SPDC, relations became 
problematic with the significant growth of anti-Chinese sentiments pushing to relax Sino-
Myanmar cooperation.148 The USDP faced a significant challenge–the government was 
pinned between its receptiveness towards a civil society of anti-Chinese protests and its 
foreign policy of Pauk-Phaw relations with China.149 As a result, Myanmar became 
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inclined to reduce bilateral cooperation with Beijing, seeking to “balance different external 
actors against one another to minimize external pressures and maximize concessions.”150 
Meanwhile, ethnic conflict re-emerged as the military conducted military 
operations against both the Kachin and the Kokang, producing significant strains on Sino-
Myanmar cooperation. In 2011, heightened tensions over dam projects in the Kachin 
regions proliferated into violent fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA), one of the EAOs that signed a ceasefire agreement with the 
government in 1994.151 In 2015, as skirmishes continued irregularly with the Kachin, the 
Tatmadaw became entangled in another conflict as fighting resumed with the MNDAA in 
the Kokang region. Both conflicts intensified ethnic fighting, displaced personnel, and 
destabilized the Sino-Myanmar border. 
B. CASE STUDIES  
Similar to Chapter II, this section focuses on several significant case studies from 
2011 to 2015 and examines the role played by the four driving factors of Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation described in Chapter I: regime type, diplomacy, economy, and security. This 
section evaluates Sino-Myanmar cooperation during liberalization under the USDP regime 
and analyzes diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, utilizing vignettes to assess 
the increase or decrease of bilateral cooperation. The responses taken by both governments, 
therefore, measure cooperation. 
1. The Regime Type Factor – The “Quasi-Civilian” Democracy 
Upon taking office in March 2011, President Thein Sein immediately continued to 
liberalize the country, causing the international community to hope that Myanmar’s 
political landscape was indeed democratizing. During his first days in office, Thein Sein 
implemented a series of political, social, and economic reforms leading to several domestic 
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changes.152 Politically, the government increased its interaction “with Aung San Suu Kyi, 
who had been released from her third seven-year period of house arrest,” and slowly 
integrated her into Myanmar’s political environment.153 In August, Aung San Suu Kyi 
undertook her first political trip to meet with President Thein Sein.154 This trip became a 
precursor to a series of meetings between the USDP and the opposition leader in an attempt 
to sway public sentiments towards the new regime.155 Socially, government controls on 
electronic media relaxed, providing the public a plethora of information that was previously 
banned.156 Regarding ethnic minorities and political opposition groups, the government 
attempted to seek a compromise in a “wide-ranging peace process.”157 Economically, the 
USDP passed reforms in policies such as currency exchange rates, taxation, foreign 
investment, and anti-corruption, in an attempt to establish a stable market economy.158 
Also, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was invited by the USDP to send an 
advisement team to assess the country’s exchange rate reform.159 The domestic changes 
in Myanmar’s environment had been significant. While many “gaps were [still] apparent 
between the reform narrative and concrete action on the ground,” many in the international 
community continued to be surprised.160 
Perhaps the most significant, yet unanticipated, impact of Myanmar’s liberalization 
rested with its foreign policy relationship with China, the country’s largest benefactor since 
the SLORC/SPDC years. Years of isolation coupled with international sanctions brought 
Myanmar to lean heavily on China for diplomatic, military, and economic assistance.161 
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As a result, bilateral ties considerably strengthened. Tatmadaw elites developed concerns 
over China’s increased influence as relations were perceived to be asymmetrically in favor 
of China.162 The Tatmadaw were irritated, particularly when dealing with China to address 
Myanmar’s internal security along the border. Whereas Chinese relations during the 
SLORC/SPDC regime proved beneficial in resolving Myanmar’s ethnic minority 
challenges, this perception shifted because of the Tatmadaw’s experiences during the 
Kokang Conflict in 2009.163 As Haacke states, “China was no longer regarded as an asset,” 
rather, “China came to be seen as accentuating” Myanmar’s ethnic minority challenge.164 
The Tatmadaw thus considered opportunities to loosen relations with China by diversifying 
Myanmar’s foreign policy portfolio.165 
Anti-Chinese sentiments on the lower levels of Myanmarese society further 
reinforced the Tatmadaw’s desire to loosen relations with Beijing. These sentiments 
stemmed from several aspects. First, the population viewed China’s support of the 
Tatmadaw as the main reason for the junta’s sustained power.166 Both military and 
economic support from China enabled the junta to continue its aggressive policy of political 
repression. China, in this regard, was “guilty by association” for tolerating the Tatmadaw’s 
oppressive nature. Second, the population was also unhappy about the severe 
environmental and social effects of various Sino-Myanmar economic ventures.167 
Environmentally, several projects were built on sacred rivers or land, caused flooding, or 
displaced inhabitants–none of which was favorable to the local populace.168 Economically, 
most of Myanmar’s population did not benefit from Chinese businesses and investors, 
because Beijing gave “little regard for sustainable development, job creation or technology 
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transfers.”169 In many cases, a vast majority of the output from China’s energy projects 
flowed back across Chinese borders to support the Yunnan Province. As a result, the 
projects did little to assist Myanmar’s weak energy situation. Indeed, sentiments of 
“dissatisfaction over China’s growing influence” seemed to become increasingly popular 
among both the Tatmadaw elites and the domestic population.170 
2. The Diplomatic Factor – Warm Relations with the West 
The political, economic, and social reforms Myanmar undertook opened windows 
of opportunity to bolster relations with the international community. As a result, 
Myanmar’s liberalization “paid dividends in terms of the country’s external relations.”171 
Thein Sein re-established previous foreign policies, gaining access to much needed foreign 
direct investment from various global financial institutions.172 Country cooperation with 
regional powers such as India, Japan, and the United States strengthened.173 
Several examples depict Myanmar’s strengthening of relations with the 
international communities. Whereas the Indian navy had conducted port calls as early as 
2002, liberalization brought an increase in security and defense cooperation efforts.174 In 
2013, the Myanmar navy conducted its port call to India.175 In addition, both countries 
began bilateral exercises patrolling the southern Bay of Bengal.176 Similarly, Myanmar-
Japan relations improved with diplomatic visits in 2012 and 2013.177 Japan played a key 
role in assisting Myanmar clear debts “with the World Bank and Asian Development 
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Bank.”178 Unlike the United States and other western powers, after the 8–8-88 uprising, 
Tokyo did not impose sanctions on Myanmar.179 Rather, Tokyo had offered significant 
debt relief in hopes of influencing reform and incentivizing global financial institutions to 
return.180 The strengthening of ties with various regional partners led to the diversification 
of Myanmar’s foreign policy portfolio. 
The most significant strengthening of relations for Myanmar, however, was its 
rapprochement with the United States. Whereas U.S.-Myanmar relations had not been 
stable since 1988, relations changed under President Obama as the United States began to 
“pivot to the Pacific.”181 In August of 2011, the Obama administration appointed “Derek 
Mitchell as special representative and policy coordinator for Myanmar.”182 This office 
proved to be critical in bolstering relations with the United States, alleviating sanctions, 
and paving the path for “U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Myanmar in 
November of 2011.”183 As a result, the United States reshaped their political agenda to 
reflect “strategic engagement” policies with Myanmar leading to the improvement of 
bilateral relations.184 In 2012, President Obama visited Myanmar in a show of acceptance 
of the USDP’s legitimacy and in support of the reforms the government had 
implemented.185 Thus, Myanmar became the “new darling of the West” as sanctions were 
lifted and Western aid began to flow.186 
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3. The Economic Factor – Anti-Chinese Protests 
Compared to previous years of Sino-Myanmar economic cooperation, relations 
notably declined during the USDP years. The main source of the decline grew from public 
protests over various Sino-Myanmar projects. Aware of the oncoming turmoil in 
Myanmar’s domestic politics, Chinese investors pushed to finalize three major investments 
in hydropower, mining, and energy transportation just before the 2010 elections.187 These 
projects were the “Myitsone Dam, the Letpadaung Copper Mine, and the Sino-Myanmar 
oil and gas pipelines.”188 Combined, these projects consisted of US$13 billion in 
investments, leading China to become Myanmar’s top source for foreign investments.189 
Of the three projects, the most significant was the Myitsone Dam, a US$3.6 billion 
joint venture between China and several Myanmar contractors.190 During the USDP years, 
these three projects became the main sources of public pressure that led to the decline of 
Sino-Myanmar economic cooperation (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. The Myitsone Dam, the Letpadaung Mine, and Sino-
Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines191 
While negotiations on the Myitsone Dam project had concluded in 2009, the project 
drew criticism for several reasons.192 First, the dam’s location was along the Irrawaddy 
River in the region of the Kachin.193 The Kachin considered the area sacred while the 
Irrawaddy was known as a historical site for all Burmese.194 Second, the project was meant 
to produce hydroelectric power to support both countries, thus partly resolving Myanmar’s 
lack of energy challenge. However, 90% of the output flowed into China’s Yunnan 
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Province, essentially leaving Myanmar’s population with no feasible solution for its weak 
power situation.195 Third, there were enormous social and environmental impacts. 
Thousands of villagers and fisherman would be displaced while sediment flows affected 
others located downstream.196 Coupled with the flooding of an area roughly the size of 
Singapore, these aspects ignited public protests from both domestic and international 
audiences.197 
Appealing to public protests, on September 30, 2011, President Thein Sein decided 
to suspend work on the dam “until the end of his tenure.”198 By doing this, Thein Sein 
challenged previous norms of Sino-Myanmar cooperation. He based his decision on public 
opposition and both social and environmental impacts. Also, Thein Sein stated his actions 
were based on the “will of the people,” and in “light of democracy.”199 Many 
stakeholders–including the project’s main investor the Chinese Power Investment Corp 
(CPI)–were stunned and at a loss.200 Trapped between its receptiveness to public protests 
and its close relationship with China, the USDP moved to appease the public. Author 
Debby Sze Wan Chan remarks that “the quasi-civilian government that had prepared to 
gain legitimacy through elections could no longer be exempted from paying audience costs 
for failing domestic constituents in international economic disputes.”201 Thein Sein’s 
decision was popular as it garnered support from both the domestic population and senior 
elites.202 Nevertheless, the dam’s suspension came as a significant shock to China.203 
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The Myitsone Dam was not the only Sino-Myanmar project affected by public 
opposition. In 2012, the government temporarily halted work on the Letpadaung Copper 
Mine in Monywa, Sagaing Region for “land grabbing and environmental pollution.”204 
The project was a “joint venture between Wanbao Mining–a subsidiary of China North 
Industries Corporation (NORINCO)–and Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd 
(UMEHL).”205 This time, however, protests were violently put down by the government, 
leaving “70-100 activists with severe injuries.”206 An investigation committee led by Aung 
San Suu Kyi was initiated to alleviate public concerns and examine the project’s social and 
environmental impacts.207 Whereas the report authorized the project’s continuation, it also 
stipulated that the project lacked environmental, social, and health assessments.208 Work 
eventually resumed with the completion of the assessments. However, China now 
understood that to protect its economic interests, Beijing needed to adjust its business 
practices with the local population to accommodate Myanmar’s opening to public opinion. 
A third project that experienced challenges during Myanmar’s political transition 
were the Sino-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines. Similar to the Letpadaung Mine and 
Myitsone Dam, the joint venture project “between China National Petroleum Company 
(CNPC) and Myanmar’s Ministry of Energy” also concluded negotiations in 2009, with 
construction beginning in 2010.209 Both the gas and oil pipelines were completed in 2013 
and 2014, respectively.210 Similarly, controversy focused on social and environmental 
impacts. However, these issues were not as severely exacerbated by protests when 
compared to the Myitsone Dam and Letpadaung Copper Mine. This was because the 
pipelines included several other foreign stakeholder countries–India and South Korea.211 
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From 2010 to 2013, Chinese investment degraded from $8.2B in 2010 to $56M.212 During 
the Thein Sein years, Myanmar’s opening to public opinions caused Sino-Myanmar 
relations to experience “cooperation difficulties.”213 Although Chinese FDI had rebounded 
to $2.3 billion by 2015, these numbers were still significantly reduced in comparison to 
numbers before liberalization in 2010.214 
4. The Security Factor – Border Instability 
Similar to the economic factor, cooperation over Myanmar’s internal security 
degraded during the USDP years. Although this factor has been the most influential source 
of Myanmar’s frustration with China, it is also the main reason why bilateral cooperation 
mostly continues. From 2011 to 2015, bilateral cooperation lessened because of two 
significant events. The first event stemmed from the 2011 Kachin Conflict, which ended a 
17-year ceasefire and continues today.215 The second event arose from the re-emergence 
of the Kokang Conflict in 2015 which has also continued sporadically throughout the years. 
Each event provoked different responses from China, alluding to the immense complexity 
of Sino-Myanmar internal security relations. 
After dealing with the Kokang in 2009, fighting along the Sino-Myanmar border 
arose in 2011 as the Tatmadaw moved to disarm and neutralize the Kachin Independence 
Army (KIA), one of the ethnic groups that had signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994.216 
Whereas the trigger for the immediate fighting arose over control of the Chinese Dapein 
Dam, the main source of the overall conflict spawned from decades of ethnic grievances 
that dated back to Myanmar’s independence. In 1994, the government allowed the Kachin 
Independence Organization (KIO) to have political autonomy in exchange for signing the 
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ceasefire agreement.217 The agreement created temporary stability and peace between the 
Kachin and the military for 17 years.218 Before the 2010 elections, the ceasefire began to 
unravel when the KIO rejected the Tatmadaw’s push to convert EAOs into Border Guard 
Forces (BGF).219 On June 9, 2011, fighting broke out in Kachin State when Tatmadaw 
forces engaged in military operations to secure a hydropower power project funded by the 
Chinese Datang Group, the Dapein Dam.220 The initial conflict left several dead with 
thousands more fleeing the region across the Sino-Myanmar border.221 Contrasted to the 
Kokang Incident in 2009, which was considered an “easy success” due to the relative 
number of Kokang forces, the KIA represented a more significant challenge with an army 
of roughly 4,000.222 
President Thein Sein attempted to contain the conflict several times by ordering a 
halt to military operations but was unsuccessful and ignored by Tatmadaw leaders.223  As 
a result, sporadic fighting continued into 2013.224  During this time, the government 
attempted to resolve issues through ceasefire negotiations. However, this produced few 
results because the two sides were unable to achieve an acceptable compromise. In January 
of 2013, the “Tatmadaw launched large-scale air strikes and artillery attacks” on the KIO 
headquarters based in Laiza, near the Sino-Myanmar border.225 Both air and artillery 
strikes exploded inside Chinese territory causing thousands again to flee across the border 
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to seek refuge. In response, China mobilized troops along the border to ensure stability.226 
As a result, the conflict presented severe challenges for both China and Myanmar. 
Myanmar’s liberalization caused China’s responses to vary in the 2011 and 2013 
Kachin conflicts–the latter provoked a mobilization of Chinese forces along with an active 
intervention for ceasefire talks.227 The changes in Chinese responses were due to two 
reasons. The first reason stemmed from the timing of the conflicts, coupled with 
Myanmar’s political liberalization. According to Sun, China’s response to the Kachin 
Conflict in 2011 was mostly “aloof and distant.”228 At this point, Chinese investments had 
remained unaffected. However, by 2013, public protests had penetrated various Sino-
Myanmar projects such as the Myitsone Dam and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, 
the latter of which was operational by 2013. Thus, the undermining of China’s economic 
interests provoked a “more proactive response” to the Kachin Conflict in 2013. 
The second reason arose from the warming of Myanmar’s relations with the West. 
Both the USDP and the KIO invited the U.S. and U.K. to observe negotiations.229 China 
rejected the proposal. A U.S. presence, particularly along China’s borders, was of great 
concern to Chinese national security.230 In addition, according to Han, China became more 
involved in the Kachin Conflict “because it was concerned about the involvement of the 
U.S. and UK in the peace-negotiation process.”231 As a result, China proactively engaged 
with border stability issues in an attempt to protect its economic interests and national 
security. The contrast between Chinese responses in 2011 and 2013 highlighted a change 
in patterns of Sino-Myanmar relations. 
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Aside from the Kachin Conflict, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Kokang 
resurfaced in 2015 as Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng returned after fleeing the region in 
2009.232 His attempt to reclaim the Kokang region engulfed the MNDAA in several 
months of fighting with the military. In response, the Tatmadaw launched air strikes on the 
MNDAA. Due to the proximity of the MNDAA to the Sino-Myanmar border, five Chinese 
citizens died. Although Myanmar issued a formal apology to Beijing, China aggressively 
responded “by conducting a series of integrated live-fire drills.”233 The military escalation 
of force clearly illustrated yet another departure of Pauk-Phaw relations. According to 
Haacke, during this period, “bilateral relations hit a low.”234 
In regards to Sino-Myanmar cooperation, both the Kachin Conflict in 2013 and the 
Kokang Conflict in 2015 depicted clear departures from traditional Pauk-Phaw patterns. 
In both instances, China’s frustrations were made evident with the mobilization of forces 
to maintain stability along the Sino-Myanmar border. In addition, the Kachin conflict 
“became the first instance where the Chinese government was actively involved in rounds 
of peace negotiations between the Myanmar government and an ethnic rebel group.”235 
China’s actions were a sharp departure from Sino-Myanmar relations under the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, specifically in regards to non-intervention in one’s 
domestic affairs.236 Indeed, the instability along the Sino-Myanmar border contributed 
significantly to the downgrading of Sino-Myanmar cooperation. 
C. ANALYZING THE FACTORS  
The previous section examined both the role and impact of the four factors that 
shaped Sino-Myanmar relations from 2011 to 2015. Whereas political liberalization 
directly affected Myanmar’s regime type, it also indirectly affected the diplomatic, 
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economic, and security factors. Thus, the collective decline in these three factors led to a 
relaxing in bilateral cooperation. 
Myanmar’s need for diplomatic protection declined as political liberalization 
provided opportunities to reestablish relations with the West. Thein Sein and the USDP 
diversified Myanmar’s foreign policy portfolio. Myanmar strengthened relations with 
India, Japan, and the United States, opening the country to foreign direct investment and 
trade. As a result, international sanctions began to relax beginning in 2012, causing 
Myanmar’s economic dependence on China to fall.237 
Economic dependence on China declined significantly with the development of 
public protests towards Chinese investment projects. Chinese FDI numbers “sharply 
dropped” in 2012 when compared to the prior liberalization year of 2010.238  Although 
FDI rebounded in 2015, FDI never peaked as high as its apex in 2010. China learned several 
valuable, but harsh, lessons from Myanmar’s political liberalization. First, state-to-state 
interactions solely with the Tatmadaw were no longer sufficient to protect its economic 
interests. Because the agreements to develop the Myitsone Dam, the Letpadaung Mine, and 
the Sino-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines was concluded amidst Myanmar’s political 
transition, they were not endorsed by the country’s domestic population, which had mainly 
become anti-Chinese.239 Beijing would now have to engage at the lower levels to garner 
support from the local communities.240 Second, coupled with the first, China’s extractive 
business practices and norms re-oriented. If Beijing wanted to shift perceptions to be more 
favorable to Myanmar’s local communities, Chinese business practices needed to 
incorporate the environmental, health, and social impacts of future projects.241 Third, it 
became apparent that Chinese economic influence within Myanmar’s domestic affairs was 
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no longer monolithic–the warming of relations with the West diversified Myanmar’s 
economic portfolio.242 As a result, Beijing now competed with new foreign direct 
investors.243 A new pattern emerged within Sino-Myanmar economic cooperation. 
The Sino-Myanmar security factor decreased cooperation for several reasons. First, 
the Tatmadaw had “long-standing suspicions” that China’s influence exacerbated 
Myanmar’s ethnic conflict challenge rather than alleviate it.244 China’s expanded 
influence thus hindered Myanmar’s national interest in state building.245 Second, 
substantial disagreements existed as to how to resolve the ethnic conflict challenge. On the 
one hand, Myanmar adopted a hybrid strategy of diplomacy and military force to resolve 
the EAO dilemma. On the other hand, China encouraged a more diplomatic solution, 
favoring dialogue and encouraging the ceasefire process to move forward. Third, related 
to the second, was China’s involvement in ceasefire negotiations. Myanmar’s warming of 
relations with the West opened potential opportunities to “internationalize” the ethnic 
conflict challenge, which greatly concerned China.246 Whereas Myanmar deemed the 
involvement of international players in ceasefire negotiations as acceptable, China “saw 
the invitation as insidious,” and against “Chinese national interests.”247 As a result, China 
continues to mediate in peace negotiations and contests any external involvement.248 The 
ethnic fighting continues and has resulted in the deaths of thousands on both the Tatmadaw 
and EAO fronts. The Kachin Conflict alone has displaced well over 100,000 civilians, with 
no apparent solution in sight.249 
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Chapter III finds that Myanmar’s continued political liberalization precipitated the 
weakening of bilateral cooperation with China. Liberalization changed Myanmar’s 
domestic and international environments, leading to changes in its foreign policy with 
China. The leading causes were due to Myanmar’s public pressures against Sino-Myanmar 
commercial projects, increased ethnic conflict along Myanmar’s shared border with China, 
and Myanmar’s warming of relations with the West. 
Domestically, Myanmar’s receptiveness towards public opinion transformed years 
of anti-Chinese sentiments into public protests leading to a series of complications in 
Myanmar’s economic dealings with China. The notable highlights illustrating less 
cooperation in the economic factor were the suspension of the Myitsone Dam in 2011, the 
Letpadaung Mines in 2012, and heated controversy regarding the Sino-Myanmar Oil and 
Gas Pipelines in 2013.250 Additionally, ethnic conflict continued to manifest along the 
Sino-Myanmar border. However, Myanmar’s opening to the West provoked China to shift 
its response. Both the Kachin Conflict in 2011 and Kokang Conflict in 2015 illustrated a 
departure from previous norms as China mobilized its military to the Sino-Myanmar border 
and actively engaged in peace negotiations.251 
Internationally, Myanmar’s warming of relations with the West enabled Myanmar 
to diversify its foreign policy. The most notable difference was Myanmar’s strengthening 
of ties with the United States. The changed domestic and international landscape thus 
provided Thein Sein and the USDP the maneuverability to loosen relations with China, 
whose influence had become monolithic since the SLORC/SPDC years. As a result, 
Myanmar tempered the steady growth of Chinese influence in Myanmar’s domestic affairs. 
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IV. AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND THE NLD: NEW PATTERNS
(2016 – 2018)
Chapter III found that under reformist president Thein Sein, Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation weakened because of national anti-Chinese sentiments, increased ethnic 
conflict, and Myanmar’s warming relations with the West. Chapter IV now answers this 
thesis’s central question. To what extent have Sino-Myanmar relations changed as a result 
of Myanmar’s liberalization? This chapter is broken up into four sections. The first section 
describes the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD). 
The second section evaluates the nature of challenges Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD 
currently face. The third section characterizes the shift in China’s economic, security, and 
diplomatic support for Myanmar. The fourth and last section summarizes the findings of 
this chapter.  
Chapter IV finds that Sino-Myanmar bilateral relations have rebounded from the 
previous era under Thein Sein because Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD continue to face 
challenges that necessitate Beijing’s economic, security, and diplomatic assistance. 
Myanmar finds itself once again within China’s influential orbit for several reasons. First, 
Myanmar’s opening to the West did not entice as much foreign direct investment as 
initially predicted. As a result, China’s contribution to Myanmar’s economy remains 
significant. Second, peace talks with EAOs along the Sino-Myanmar border continue to 
break down. China’s role in facilitating negotiations between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs 
have caused bilateral security ties to strengthen. Third, Myanmar’s human rights violations 
against the Rohingya continue to attract international criticism. Diplomatic ties with China 
are tightening while Beijing continues to shield Myanmar from international intervention. 
Despite a temporary decrease in cooperation with China due to Myanmar’s political 
transition in 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have increased economic, security, and 
diplomatic cooperation, resulting in a stronger Sino-Myanmar relationship than during the 
previous regime under Thein Sein and the USDP. 
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A. AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND THE NLD 
Political liberalization drove a new regime to come to power as Aung San Suu Kyi 
and the NLD won the elections of 2015. As a result, the events of November 8, 2015, 
marked a historic moment in Myanmar’s political landscape leading to several significant 
changes in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. First, the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD 
introduced new actors to Myanmar’s political framework. Second, related to the first, was 
the marginalization of the military-backed USDP with only a fraction of the power it won 
in the 2010 elections.252 As Myanmar’s political framework diversifies, China is now 
forced to deal with a multi-dimensional institution consisting of multiple parties and 
various state actors. Third, a rather big surprise was the further marginalization of ethnic 
minority parties.253 During the election many ethnic minorities voted for the NLD, 
disregarding their local minority parties. In comparison to the 2010 election, ballots 
showed that the number of political parties more than tripled in the 2015 elections, allowing 
well-known parties like the NLD to capitalize on the fragmentation.254 The 
marginalization of ethnic parties was significant because the NLD is perceived to be a party 
of the Burman majority. Indeed, there are concerns that the NLD “does not understand the 
grievances or aspirations of ethnic” minorities.255 Combined, the changes in Myanmar’s 
political landscape have led to changes in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. 
Given Aung San Suu Kyi’s decades of imprisonment, her continuous struggle for 
democracy, and her historical lineage as the youngest daughter of national hero Aung San, 
Aung San Suu Kyi quickly became a favorite figure to the Myanmarese people.256 Also, 
Aung San Suu Kyi personifies “change” from the authoritarian rule of the military since 
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1962, “giving her popularity unmatched by any other politician.”257 Although 
constitutional restrictions prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from assuming the role of 
president, the NLD endorsed her lifetime friend Htin Kyaw, whom many viewed to be her 
proxy.258 As the de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi became the nation’s First State 
Counsellor.259 Lastly, the perception of Aung San Suu Kyi’s strong pro-Western policy 
preference concerns China. Beijing has re-oriented its state-to-state engagements to 
accommodate the new actors entering Myanmar’s political environment.260 
China’s reaction to the new regime has differed from previous years in several 
ways. First, with the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi, it became evident that Beijing could no 
longer conduct state-to-state relations solely with the Tatmadaw. Instead, China has 
engaged with multiple parties. Second, having undergone turbulence with the Thein Sein 
regime, Beijing viewed the possibility of a new regime with caution.261 In June 2015, 
recognizing that Myanmar’s political transition would likely incorporate Aung San Suu 
Kyi into the government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proactively invited Aung 
San Suu Kyi to Beijing.262 The visit served as reassurance that the CCP would work with 
a possible NLD-led government.263 As a result, ties between the CCP and the NLD 
strengthened. The engagement proved to be beneficial as the NLD won the 2015 elections 
in a landslide claiming 79% of National Assembly seating.264 Thus, changes in Myanmar’s 
institutions and state actors led to changes in China’s state-to-state relations with Myanmar. 
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B. CHALLENGES OF THE NEW REGIME   
Since the rise of the NLD in 2015, the regime faces several challenges that require 
China’s assistance. The first challenge stems from Myanmar’s slow economic growth. The 
second challenge arises from reaching a peace deal with the EAOs along the Sino-
Myanmar border. A third challenge comes from the Rakhine State and the Tatmadaw’s 
constant oppression of the Rohingya population. Given the economic, political, and 
diplomatic tools that Beijing provides to these problem sets, Myanmar is inclined to 
maintain traditional Pauk-Phaw relations with China. As a result, China is likely to remain 
an influential player in Myanmar’s domestic environment. 
1. The Economy Factor – Economic Growth 
The NLD regime faces challenges to stimulate Myanmar’s economy. In October 
2016, the United States lifted sanctions levied on Myanmar since 1997.265 Although the 
lifting of economic sanctions was quite significant, economic growth has proceeded at a 
“sluggish” pace.266 The main reason for the decline stems from the domestic and foreign 
policy uncertainties caused by Myanmar’s liberalization.267 As a result, there has been 
little movement on the economic front.268 For example, the regime has failed to produce 
clear guidance on “building infrastructure, inviting investments, and creating power supply 
sources.”269 Also, the restructuring of commissions, economic committees, and 
implementation of reforms has lagged.270 Although foreign businesses see Myanmar as a 
country of potential opportunity, the instability in the country’s economic policies has led 
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to a lack of foreign direct investment.271 International businesses have been cautious to 
invest and are waiting to see how the NLD plans to stabilize the uncertainty of Myanmar’s 
economic reforms. 
Exacerbating the NLD’s economic challenge is China’s reluctance to invest in 
Myanmar’s economy. The turmoil China endured in 2012 with the protesting of the 
Myitsone Dam and Letpadaung Mine left Beijing wary of its future economic investments. 
Although China remained as Myanmar’s largest investor, committing “to 35 new FDI 
projects from 2014,” China learned from its previous dealings with the junta and has been 
careful not to oversaturate Myanmar’s economy with FDI.272 In 2015, bilateral trade 
dropped “38.8% from the previous year” of 2014.273 In 2016, bilateral trade “further 
decreased by 18.6%.”274 
However, signs of increased bilateral economic ties seemed to strengthen as Aung 
San Suu Kyi attended the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Summit, also known as the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI), in May 2017.275 During the summit, Aung San Suu Kyi signed 
two economic agreements, one for a border economic zone along the “Yunnan Province-
Kachin State border,” and the other agreeing to cooperate on the BRI.276 However, funding 
for the OBOR initiative has yet to be appropriated.277 Indeed, the previous growth in anti-
Chinese sentiments during the USDP era has caused Beijing to be cautious of the impacts 
of increased Chinese FDI in Myanmar.278 
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2. The Security Factor – Unstable Peace Talks 
The second significant domestic challenge the NLD faces is Myanmar’s persistent 
struggle to end ethnic conflict. From Myanmar’s perspective, the government cannot deal 
effectively with the various EAOs “unless it exercises real power over the ceasefire 
groups.”279 This can only be possible with “active cooperation on the part of Chinese 
authorities.”280 Although a draft National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed in 
March 2015, several notable Chinese-backed EAOs refused to sign–to include the United 
Wa State Army, the KIA, and the MNDAA.281 In May 2017, China brokered a deal to 
bring several EAOs to the negotiation table, but little progress concerning “political and 
military issues” was made.282 The situation has become quite complicated with the 
formation of the Federal Political Negotiation Council Consultative Commission 
(FPNCC), an alliance consisting of the seven most powerful ethnic groups (to include those 
previously mentioned) along the Sino-Myanmar border.283 Presently, even as negotiations 
continue over the NCA, skirmishes have persisted between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. 
The conflicts involve both signatory and non-signatory EAOs posing major challenges for 
the fairly inexperienced NLD regime and the new president replacing Htin Kyaw, former 
Speaker of the House of Representatives Win Myint.284 As there appears to be no clear 
solution in sight, Myanmar’s need to maintain cooperative relations with China has been 
driven largely by the government’s desire for national reconciliation and peace along the 
Sino-Myanmar border.285 
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3. The Diplomacy Factor – The Rohingya Challenge 
The third and perhaps the most notable, international challenge the NLD faces is 
the ongoing Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar’s western region of Rakhine State. The Rohingya 
Conflict has attracted significant international attention presenting significant challenges 
to Myanmar’s global reputation. The main challenge stems from Myanmar’s “use of 
disproportionate military force” against the Rohingya.286 As a result, the Rohingya 
challenge constitutes a complex humanitarian crisis that is propagating outside of 
Myanmar’s borders and into the international community. 
Identified by the government as “foreigners,” the Rohingya consist of roughly a 
million Muslims living in the northern Rakhine State of Myanmar.287 They are the “most 
deprived group in East Asia” who suffer from “poverty, poor social services and a scarcity 
of livelihood opportunities.”288 Furthermore, the Myanmar government considers the 
Rohingya “permanently stateless.”289 At various times through history, clashes between 
non-Muslims and Muslims have occurred in Rakhine. Recently, attacks were conducted in 
October 2016 by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on Myanmar Border 
Guard Posts (BGP).290 In response, Myanmar’s Armed Forces engaged (and continue to 
engage) the Rohingya with “clearance operations marked by widespread and systematic 
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human rights violations, including unlawful killings, sexual violence and other forms of 
torture.”291  
Internationally, the military’s response has been characterized as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.292 Of note, predominantly Muslim countries such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia have taken strong positions against Myanmar’s handling of the 
situation. Despite the potential for the Rohingya situation to “destabilize the entire 
operating environment,” China has shielded Myanmar from international criticism and 
continues to uphold traditional Pauk-Phaw patterns of non-interference.293 The Rohingya 
Crisis has not been resolved and continues today. Since August 2017, over 655,000 
Rohingya have been displaced and have fled to Myanmar’s neighbor country, 
Bangladesh.294 During the Pope’s visit to Myanmar in November 2017, Senior General 
Min Aung Hlaing commented that “Myanmar has no discrimination among the 
ethnics.”295 Despite this rhetoric, violence against the Rohingya continues to occur. 
The NLD’s response to the public and the international community on the Rohingya 
Crisis has been relatively muted. Aung San Suu Kyi’s public statements have been 
defensive in favor of the military and at times have omitted mention of what the 
government proposes to do regarding the crisis.296 To some extent, the international 
community has lost faith in Aung San Suu Kyi. Recently, she was stripped of her Freedom 
of Oxford award for her silence over the Rohingya Crisis, which had been given to her in 
1997 for her continuous struggle for democracy.297 As the Rohingya Crisis has grown, the 
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need for international intervention has strengthened. Myanmar’s relations with many other 
countries have suffered as a result of this crisis, leading Myanmar to seek diplomatic 
support from China. In response, Beijing has expressed open support for Myanmar’s 
handling of the Rohingya. 
C. CHINA’S CHANGED RESPONSES 
Myanmar’s current economic, security, and diplomatic challenges have produced 
several notable changes in China’s behavior. Economically, as a result of the previous era, 
China has tempered the flow of investments into Myanmar.298 China is careful not to flood 
the economy with FDI to prevent the further growth of anti-Chinese sentiments. Although 
cooperation appears to have strengthened from the BRI, funding flowing into Myanmar’s 
economy has been limited.299 
In addition to China’s economic response, Beijing’s response to ethnic conflict 
along the Sino-Myanmar border has been more proactive and assertive when compared to 
the prior years of liberalization.300 There are two main reasons for China’s shift. First, 
Myanmar’s diversification of its foreign policy and warming of relations with the West has 
introduced “geostrategic competition.”301 Given the proximity of the ethnic conflicts to 
the Sino-Myanmar border, the introduction of foreign powers to assist with peace 
negotiations threatens China’s national security. Second, China appears unhappy with how 
Myanmar is handling ethnic conflict along the border, mainly due to the number of refugees 
and cross-border explosions that have occurred.302 In 2015, the explosion of several bombs 
and artillery shells on the Chinese side of the border caused Myanmar to issue an apology 
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to Beijing.303 Collectively, these reasons have led China to become critically engaged in 
Myanmar’s peace negotiation process. 
China’s diplomatic protection of Myanmar from the international community 
because of human rights abuses appears to be the most consistent factor in Sino-Myanmar 
relations. As a result, China has expressed support for the NLD’s “efforts to protect 
stability.”304 Although “China condemned the attacks in Rakhine,” China has upheld its 
Pauk-Phaw relationship with Myanmar. Beijing stated that its principle “was not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of another country.”305 This pattern has been consistent with 
established Pauk-Phaw patterns. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, following the process of liberalization, Sino-Myanmar relations have both 
strengthened and changed after an initial period of decreased cooperation. Under Aung San 
Suu Kyi and the NLD, bilateral ties have gradually rebounded from the previous decline in 
2012. Whereas liberalization was perceived to be the primary driver that weakened 
relations with China, Myanmar’s need for economic, security, and diplomatic support have 
prevented Sino-Myanmar relations from declining further. Myanmar incorporates China 
into its calculus to achieve two issues of significant national interest–resolving ethnic 
conflict along the Sino-Myanmar border and achieving a positive economic growth 
trajectory. Also, the Tatmadaw’s oppression of the Rohingya continues to internationally 
highlight Myanmar in a negative light inclining Myanmar to strengthen diplomatic ties 
with China. As a result, Myanmar’s dependence on China to resolve these challenges 
suggests that bilateral cooperation will persist. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The central question posed by this thesis was why Sino-Myanmar cooperation has 
not declined as drastically as initially predicted following the government’s liberalization 
period from 2008 to 2015. Furthermore, this thesis asked two related questions. What 
factors explained changes in the Sino-Myanmar relationship prior to liberalization, and to 
what extent have Sino-Myanmar relations changed since liberalization? This thesis 
proposed four hypotheses to answer these questions, each formulated around a main 
driving factor in Sino-Myanmar cooperation. 
Chapter I examined the first related question by providing a historical 
characterization of the main driving factors of Sino-Myanmar cooperation. Approaching 
bilateral cooperation mainly from a Myanmar-centric perspective, Chapter I found that, 
following Myanmar’s independence in 1948, bilateral trade and investment, security along 
the Sino-Myanmar border, and diplomatic engagements were the main causes to Sino-
Myanmar cooperation. Historically known as Pauk-Phaw, or fraternal, Sino-Myanmar 
relations are driven by four main factors: regime type, economics, security, and diplomacy. 
Chapter II addressed the second related question and found that liberalization both 
directly and indirectly impacted the four driving factors, which led to increased tensions in 
bilateral cooperation. During the final years of the SPDC, Sino-Myanmar cooperation 
entered a difficult phase because of two main reasons. First, the Tatmadaw’s desire to 
reconcile ethnic armed groups before elections led to increased fighting along the Sino-
Myanmar border in 2009. Second, as liberalization opened Myanmar’s political space, the 
government became more receptive towards public opinion. These sentiments had mainly 
become anti-Chinese because of an increased dependency on China for diplomatic, 
economic, and military aid. The combined shifts of Myanmar’s security and regime type 
factors resulted in heightened tension in Sino-Myanmar relations. 
Furthermore, Chapter III found that between 2011 and 2015 bilateral relations 
continued to degrade for three main reasons. First, the impact of Myanmar’s political 
liberalization led to warmer relations with the international community and reduced the 
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government’s need for the diplomatic protection China provided in the past. Second, 
pressures of anti-Chinese sentiments escalated into public protests, which made Sino-
Myanmar economic cooperation more difficult. The apex of economic tension was seen by 
the suspension of the Myitsone Dam in 2011, along with protests against the Letpadaung 
Mine and the Sino-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines, the three most significant Sino-
Myanmar joint ventures. Third, ethnic conflict continued to intensify along the Sino-
Myanmar border with the reemergence of both the Kachin Conflict in 2011 and the Kokang 
Conflict in 2015. The collective changes in the diplomatic, economic, and security factors 
thus resulted in Sino-Myanmar relations declining to its lowest point in three decades.306 
Lastly, Chapter IV answered the thesis’s main question. Why have Sino-Myanmar 
relations not declined as drastically as initially predicted? Chapter IV found that Aung San 
Suu Kyi and the NLD’s need for economic growth, national reconciliation, and diplomatic 
protection has strengthened Sino-Myanmar cooperation despite the temporary weakening 
of bilateral ties during the liberalization era in 2011–2015. Economically, Myanmar 
continues to need international trade and investment, and China is prepared to provide it. 
Despite the lifting of Western economic sanctions in 2016, Myanmar’s economic growth 
has progressed slowly. Due to Myanmar’s political instability, many foreign investors have 
been cautious to invest.307 From the security lens, peace negotiations with ethnic armed 
groups along the Sino-Myanmar border continue to break down. Myanmar has 
strengthened bilateral security ties with China because Beijing plays a critical role in 
facilitating negotiations between the new NLD government and the various ethnic groups. 
Meanwhile, Myanmar continues to accumulate international criticism because of the 
army’s violations of the Rohingya people’s human rights in Rakhine State. Enforcing 
traditional Pauk-Phaw patterns, China has shielded Myanmar by professing open support 
to the Aung San Suu Kyi government to preserve Myanmar’s internal stability.308 
Although Myanmar has shifted its regime type transitioning from an authoritarian junta to 
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a quasi-civilian administration, the country remains within China’s sphere of influence 
because of its need for economic, security, and diplomatic support. 
A. ASSESSING CHANGE IN SINO-MYANMAR COOPERATION 
The impacts of Myanmar’s liberalization led to changes in Myanmar’s domestic 
and international environments, which further led to changes in the country’s foreign policy 
with China. Domestically, Myanmar changed its regime type moving from a fully 
authoritarian regime under a military junta to a quasi-civilian democracy with a multi-party 
system.309 In addition, the government became more receptive to public opinion. Myanmar 
moved to an open market economy to encourage foreign direct investment and trade.310  
Indirectly, liberalization inclined the Tatmadaw to utilize force to reconcile the ethnic 
armed groups along the Sino-Myanmar border. Internationally, liberalization opened 
opportunities for relations to warm with the West. Combined, these factors inclined 
President Thein Sein to loosen relations with China, who had gained an overwhelming 
influence in Myanmar’s domestic affairs during the SLORC/SPDC period.  
In response, China has shifted its foreign policy to accommodate Myanmar’s 
domestic changes. Economically, China has tempered the flow of economic investments 
into Myanmar so as not to overwhelm the economy with Chinese FDI. Also, Beijing has 
engaged at the lower levels to both garner support among the local populace and curb anti-
Chinese sentiments.311 China has also shifted its foreign business models to incorporate 
the environmental, health, and social impacts of future economic projects.312 Militarily, 
China has proactively engaged in peace negotiations between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs 
to maintain stability along the Sino-Myanmar border. Myanmar’s warming of relations 
with the West causes Beijing to worry about the peace process becoming 
“internationalized,” which would undermine China’s national security.313 Lastly, China 
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continues to shield Myanmar from the international community for the latter’s continued 
human rights atrocities. This is particularly notable in China’s latest shielding of Myanmar 
over the Rohingya Crisis. 
B. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are several implications this thesis has found regarding Sino-Myanmar 
cooperation. First, the driving factors that continue to shape Sino-Myanmar relations do 
not operate independently of one another. Instead, analyzing the factors over time reveals 
that the four factors are intricately intertwined. Also, the impacts of liberalization affected 
each factor differently. Whereas the process of liberalization directly affected the regime 
type factor and the economic factor, liberalization indirectly affected the security and 
diplomatic factors. Indeed, the complex interdependence of the factors shaping Sino-
Myanmar cooperation highlights the difficulties in characterizing the shift in Sino-
Myanmar bilateral cooperation. 
The second implication alludes to Myanmar’s struggle to balance between the 
government’s receptiveness towards public opinion and its need to address two issues of 
national interest–economic growth and reaching a peace deal with EAOs along the Sino-
Myanmar border.314 China continues to prove that it is essential to Myanmar’s calculus 
supplying FDI into Myanmar’s economy and facilitating peace negotiations between the 
Tatmadaw and various EAOs. As a result, Sino-Myanmar economic and security 
cooperation continues. 
Lastly, Myanmar’s continued oppression of its population in Rakhine State has 
swayed Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to seek diplomatic protection from China. 
Although liberalization has caused rapprochement with the West, the U.S. ability to 
influence Myanmar over human rights atrocities is relatively limited, mainly because 
Myanmar has prioritized its need for national reconciliation and economic growth over its 
need for human rights.315 If western states wish to reduce Myanmar’s human rights 
                                                 
314 Stratfor Worldview, “China and Myanmar.” 
315 Perlez, “In China, Aung San Suu Kyi Finds a Warm Welcome (and No Talk of Rohingya).” 
 69 
violations, they first must address Myanmar’s need for FDI and national reconciliation. 
Perhaps, then, leverage may be gained to compel Myanmar to reduce human rights 
violations. 
Overall, this case study illustrates that Sino-Myanmar relations are not a zero-sum 
game. That is to say that the weakening of bilateral relations in one factor does not 
necessarily mean the weakening of Sino-Myanmar cooperation overall. As analysts 
initially predicted that continued liberalization would weaken Sino-Myanmar relations, this 
thesis finds that the economic, security and diplomatic driving factors have tempered the 
further weakening of Sino-Myanmar cooperation. As a result, bilateral relations did not 
weaken following liberalization as initially predicted. Instead, after a temporary decline in 
Sino-Myanmar cooperation during Myanmar’s liberalization period, relations have both 
strengthened and changed under Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While this thesis described changes in Sino-Myanmar cooperation during 
Myanmar’s liberalization period from a Myanmar-centric perspective, there are several 
areas for future research that would strengthen this case study. The first area would be a 
case study from a China focused perspective utilizing the same framework of this thesis. 
The data gathered from that research would provide significant insight to other drivers 
underpinning the Pauk-Phaw relationship. In addition, as China continues to integrate 
Myanmar into the BRI framework this data will grow increasingly important in analyzing 
Sino-Myanmar cooperation. A second area of research involves analyzing the extent of 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s influence as an individual state actor on bilateral cooperation. Since 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s rise following the 2015 elections, her political power remains limited 
under the constitution.316 Understanding Aung San Suu Kyi’s policy preferences coupled 
with the domestic and international challenges the Myanmar government currently faces 
will contribute to understanding the trajectory of Sino-Myanmar cooperation. Combined, 
the study of both Sino-Myanmar relations from a China-centric perspective and Aung San 
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Suu Kyi as an individual state actor will provide a more holistic perspective to the Sino-
Myanmar cooperation narrative. 
 71 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“The 2008 Olympics’ Impact on China – China Business Review.” China Business 
Review. Accessed March 13, 2018. https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/the-
2008-olympics-impact-on-china/. 
Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
Barany, Zoltan. “Exits from Military Rule: Lessons for Burma.” Journal of Democracy 
26, no. 2 (April 13, 2015): 86–100. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0024. 
Barter, Dustin. “The Forgotten War in Kachin State.” Frontier Myanmar, October 23, 
2017. https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-forgotten-war-in-kachin-state. 
Beijing Newsroom. “China Sends Troops to Border with Conflict-Torn Myanmar: 
Media.” Reuters, January 11, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
myanmar/china-sends-troops-to-border-with-conflict-torn-myanmar-media-
idUSBRE90A0FN20130111. 
Bezlova, Antoneta. “BURMA: Earthquake Lets China Off the Hook” Inter Press Service. 
Accessed February 8, 2018. http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/05/burma-earthquake-
lets-china-off-the-hook/. 
Blanchard, Ben, and Kim Coghill. “China Official Says of Rohingya Crisis Foreign 
Interference Doesn’t Work” Reuters, October 21, 2017. 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-congress-myanmar/china-official-says-of-
rohingya-crisis-foreign-interference-doesnt-work-idUKKBN1CQ04X. 
Caballero-Anthony, Mely. “The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Opening up 
Spaces for Advancing Human Security.” The Pacific Review 25, no. 1 (March 1, 
2012): 113–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.632971. 
Chan, Sze Wan Debby. “Asymmetric Bargaining between Myanmar and China in the 




“China’s Myanmar Strategy: Elections Ethnic Politics and Economics.” International 
Crisis Group Asia Briefing 112 (September 21, 2010): 20. 
Chung-chi, Chao. “The Kokang Incident and the Contradictory Relations between China 
and Burma.” Asian Ethnicity 16, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 589–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2015.1083731. 
 72 
Clapp, Priscilla, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Catharin Dalpino, Abraham M. Denmark, 
Meredith Miller, and Morten B. Pedersen. The Influence of Domestic Issues on 
Myanmar’s Foreign Policy. Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 
2014. http://saber.eaber.org/sites/default/files/NBR%20report%20-
%20Myanmar.pdf. 
Cohen, Roberta. “The Burma Cyclone and the Responsibility to Protect.” Brookings, July 
21, 2008. https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-burma-cyclone-and-the-
responsibility-to-protect/. 
 “EastSouthWestNorth: Exodus From Kokang.” Accessed February 16, 2018. 
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20090828_1.htm. 
“Environmental Impact Assessment for the Myitsone Dam.” International Rivers. 
Accessed March 15, 2018. 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/environmental-impact-assessment-
for-the-myitsone-dam-2449. 
Fang, Amanda. “Myanmar’s Foreign Policy towards China 1988–2012: To What Extent 
Has Myanmar’s Foreign Policy towards China Been Determined by Global 
Geopolitical Concerns in the Period 1988–2012?” Accessed September 4, 2017. 
http://thurj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Myanmar.pdf. 
Farmaner, Mark. “Think Burma Is a Democracy Now? Think Again.” Huffington Post 
(blog), November 9, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-
farmaner/burma-election-democracy_b_8505384.html. 
Fink, Christina. “Myanmar in 2017: Insecurity and Violence.” Asian Survey 58, no. 1 
(February 1, 2018): 158–65. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.1.158. 
Fuller, Thomas. “Myanmar Suspends Construction of Myitsone Dam.” New York Times, 
September 30, 2011, sec. Asia Pacific. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/myanmar-suspends-
construction-of-controversial-dam.html. 
Gelb, Stephen, Linda Calabrese, and Xiaoyang Tang. “Foreign Direct Investment and 
Economic Transformation in Myanmar,” 2017. 
Griffiths, James. “Myanmar General Tells Pope ‘No Religious Discrimination.’” CNN. 
Accessed November 28, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/27/asia/pope-
myanmar-general/index.html. 
Haacke, Juergen. “The Nature and Management of Myanmar’s Alignment with China: 
The SLORC/SPDC Years.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 2 
(2011): 105–40. 
 73 
Haacke, Jürgen. “China’s Role in the Pursuit of Security by Myanmar’s State Peace and 
Development Council: Boon and Bane?” The Pacific Review 23, no. 1 (March 22, 
2010): 113–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740903501982. 
———. “Myanmar: Now a Site for Sino–US Geopolitical Competition?” Monograph, 
November 2012. http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/Home.aspx. 
———. Myanmar’s Foreign Policy under President U Thein Sein: Non-Aligned and 
Diversified. Trends in Southeast Asia, 2016,4. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak 
Institute, 2016. 
Hammond, Aye Thidar Kyaw, Clare. “Government Reveals 12-Point Economic Policy.” 
The Myanmar Times. Accessed June 14, 2017. 
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/21664-nld-12-point-economic-
policy-announcement.html. 
Han, Enze. “Border Conflict No Match for Sino–Myanmar Relations.” East Asia Forum 
(blog), April 27, 2017. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/04/27/border-conflict-
no-match-for-sino-myanmar-relations/. 
———. “Geopolitics, Ethnic Conflicts along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy 
Changes toward Myanmar.” Asian Security 13, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 59–73. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1290988. 
Hluttaw, Pyithu. “Myanmar: Parliamentary Elections Pyithu Hluttaw, 1990.” Accessed 
May 1, 2018. http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2388_90.htm. 
Holliday, Ian. “Beijing and the Myanmar Problem.” The Pacific Review 22, no. 4 
(October 2, 2009): 479–500. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740903127986. 
———. “Myanmar in 2012: Toward a Normal State.” Asian Survey 53, no. 1 (2013): 93–
100. 
Horsey, Richard. “Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar.” Crisis Group, May 31, 
2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/287-building-
critical-mass-peace-myanmar. 
Hunt, Luke. “Burma Bamboozles China.” The Diplomat. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
http://thediplomat.com/2011/10/burma-bamboozles-china/. 
“ICG-2015-12-09-the-Myanmar-Elections-Results-and-Implications-En-Red.pdf.” 
Accessed May 19, 2017. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/ICG-2015-12-09-
the-myanmar-elections-results-and-implications-en-red.pdf. 
“Irrawaddy Myitsone Dam.” International Rivers. Accessed March 15, 2018. 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/irrawaddy-myitsone-dam-0. 
 74 
“ISEAS_Perspective_2016_65.pdf.” Accessed May 19, 2017. 
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_65.pdf. 
Kang, Siew Kheng. “CO17183 | After Shaming Aung San Suu Kyi: Then What?” RSIS, 
Accessed April 24, 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co17183-
after-shaming-aung-san-suu-kyi-then-what/#.Wt9v5ojwbD4. 
Kumbun, Joe. “Opinion | Can A New President Pull Myanmar Out of the Quagmire of 
Conflict?” The Irrawaddy, March 29, 2018. 
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/can-new-president-pull-
myanmar-quagmire-conflict.html. 
Lim, Alvin Cheng-Hin. “Myanmar’s New Leadership And Prospects For Sino-Myanmar 
Relations – Analysis.” Eurasia Review (blog), March 23, 2016. 
http://www.eurasiareview.com/23032016-myanmars-new-leadership-and-
prospects-for-sino-myanmar-relations-analysis/. 
Lintner, Bertil. “Burma Delivers Its First Rebuff to China.” Yale Macmillan Center, 
October 3, 2011. https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/burma-delivers-its-first-
rebuff-china. 
———. “Myanmar as China’s Corridor to the Sea.” Asia Times, Accessed September 21, 
2017. http://www.atimes.com/article/myanmar-chinas-corridor-sea/. 
———. “The People’s Republic of China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw.” Project 
2049 Institute, May 9, 2017. 
Lowrey, Annie. “U.S. Sanctions on Myanmar Formally Eased.” New York Times, July 
11, 2012, sec. Asia Pacific. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/asia/us-
sanctions-on-myanmar-formally-eased.html. 
Magnier, Mark. “Myanmar Pivots Uneasily Away from China.” Los Angeles Times, 
March 24, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/world/la-fg-myanmar-
china-20130324. 
Mahtani, Shibani. “China Moves to Revive Its Sway in Myanmar.” Wall Street Journal, 
February 28, 2016, sec. World. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-moves-to-
revive-its-sway-in-myanmar-1456697644. 
Martin, Michael. “CRS: U.S. Sanctions on Burma,” October 19, 2012. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/. 




Matsui, Motokazu. “Myanmar’s Foreign Direct Investment Rush Recedes.” Financial 
Times, January 23, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/f7bda5bc-e150-11e6-8405-
9e5580d6e5fb. 
McCarthy, Stephen. “Myanmar in 2015: An Election Year.” Asian Survey 56, no. 1 
(February 1, 2016): 138–47. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.1.138. 
———. “Myanmar in 2016: Change and Slow Progress.” Asian Survey 57, no. 1 
(February 1, 2017): 142–49. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.1.142. 
Moe, Kyaw Zwa. “Burma’s Democracy: Just What the Generals Ordered.” The 
Irrawaddy, January 1, 2015. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/burmas-
democracy-just-generals-ordered.html. 
Moe, Thit Nay. “Myanmar’s Economy Sluggish during First 6 Months of New 
Government.” The Myanmar Times. Accessed April 25, 2018. 
https://www.mmtimes.com/business/23259-myanmar-s-economy-sluggish-
during-first-6-months-of-new-government.html. 
“‘My World Is Finished’: Rohingya Targeted in Crimes against Humanity in Myanmar.” 
Amnesty International USA. Accessed April 24, 2018. 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/my-world-is-finished-rohingya-targeted-in-
crimes-against-humanity-in-myanmar/. 
“Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State.” Crisis Group, December 15, 
2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-
new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state. 
“The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications.” Crisis Group, December 9, 2015. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-elections-
results-and-implications. 
“Myanmar Is Pivoting Away from China.” Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed November 
25, 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/15/myanmar-burma-is-pivoting-
away-from-china-aung-san-suu-kyi-xi-jinping-india/. 
“Myanmar: The United Wa State Army’s Uncertain Future.” Worldview Stratfor, 
Accessed August 15, 2017. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/myanmar-
united-wa-state-armys-uncertain-future. 
Myint, Sithu Aung. “China’s New Silk Road Plan: What’s in It for Myanmar?” Frontier 
Myanmar. Accessed April 23, 2018. https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/chinas-new-
silk-road-plan-whats-in-it-for-myanmar. 
 76 
Myint-U, Thant. Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia: 
Thant Myint-U: 9780374533526: Amazon.com: Books. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux. Accessed September 21, 2017. https://www.amazon.com/Where-
China-Meets-India-Crossroads/dp/0374533520. 
Myoe, Maung Aung. In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948. 
ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2011. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/17996. 
———. “The Logic of Myanmar’s China Policy.” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 
1, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 283–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891116637476. 
Obama Administration. “National Security Strategy 2015.” The White House, February 
6, 2015. http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2015/. 
Oh, Su-Ann. “Making Sencse of the Election Results in Myanmar’s Rakhine and Shan 
States.” Trends in Southeast Asia, 2016,1. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak 
Institute, 2016. 
Perlez, Jane. “In China, Aung San Suu Kyi Finds a Warm Welcome (and No Talk of 
Rohingya).” New York Times, November 30, 2017, sec. Asia Pacific. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/asia/china-myanmar-aid-
sanctions.html. 
“Rohingya Crisis.” UNICEF. Accessed April 24, 2018. 
https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bangladesh_100945.html. 
“Rohingya Crisis: A Major Threat to Myanmar Transition and Regional Stability.” Crisis 
Group, October 27, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-
asia/myanmar/rohingya-crisis-major-threat-myanmar-transition-and-regional-
stability. 
Sadan, Mandy, ed. War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar: The Kachin 
Ceasefire, 1994–2011. 1st edition. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2016. 
Seekins, Donald M. “Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire.” Asian Survey 37, no. 6 
(1997): 525–39. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645527. 
———. “Myanmar in 2008: Hardship, Compounded.” Asian Survey 49, no. 1 (2009): 
166–73. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.1.166. 
———. “Myanmar in 2009: A New Political Era?” Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (February 1, 
2010): 195–202. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.1.195. 
———. “State, Society and Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (Burma).” 
Asian Journal of Social Science 37, no. 5 (September 2009): 717–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/156848409X12474536440500. 
 77 
Selth, Andrew. “Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of 
Invasion.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008): 379–402. 
Smith, Martin. “Ethnic Politics in Myanmar: A Year of Tension and Anticipation.” 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2010, no. 1 (2010): 214–34. 
South, Ashley. Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict. 1st edition. Routledge, 2008. 
Steinberg, David. “Myanmar’s Minority Strife.” East Asia Forum (blog), October 6, 
2017. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/07/myanmars-minority-strife/. 
Steinberg, David I., and Hongwei. Fan. Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of 
Mutual Dependence. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series; No. 
121; Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2012. 
Stratfor Worldview. “China and Myanmar: Restoring a Damaged Alliance.” Stratfor 
Worldview, August 17, 2016. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-and-
myanmar-restoring-damaged-alliance. 
Sun, Yun. “A New Era for China-Myanmar Relations?” The Diplomat, December 9, 
2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/a-new-era-for-china-myanmar-relations/. 
———. “Aung San Suu Kyi and the Peace Process.” Nikkei Asian Review. Accessed 
August 29, 2017. https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Yun-Sun/Aung-San-Suu-
Kyi-and-the-peace-process. 
———. “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” 2017. 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR401-China-and-Myanmar-Peace-
Process.pdf. 
———. “China and the Changing Myanmar.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 
31, no. 4 (March 28, 2013): 51–77. 
———. “China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict.” Great Powers and the 
Changing Myanmar. Stimson, January 2014. 
———. “China, the United States, and the Kachin Conflict.” Stimson Center. Accessed 
April 11, 2018. https://www.stimson.org/content/china-united-states-and-kachin-
conflict. 
———. “China to Enhance Its Role in Myanmar’s Peace Process.” Stimson Center, April 
7, 2016. https://www.stimson.org/content/china-enhance-its-role-myanmars-
peace-process. 
———. “China’s Belt and Road in Myanmar.” The Diplomat, January 2018, no. 38 
(December 26, 2017). https://magazine.thediplomat.com/#/issues/-
L0O6mt3hCZYrxYRpHJf/read. 
 78 
———. “China’s Relations with Myanmar: Does an NLD Government Mark a New 
Era?” Asia Times, December 8, 2015. http://www.atimes.com/article/chinas-
relations-with-myanmar-does-an-nld-government-mark-a-new-era/. 
———. “Chinese Investment in Myanmar: What Lies Ahead?” Great Powers and the 
Changing Myanmar, 2013. 
Swanström, Niklas. Sino-Myanmar Relations: Security and beyond. Institute for Security 
and Development Policy, 2012. 
Tan, See Seng. “Providers Not Protectors: Institutionalizing Responsible Sovereignty in 
Southeast Asia.” Asian Security 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 201–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2011.615081. 
Taylor, Robert H. Can Myanmar’s NLD Government Undo the Gordian Knot of 
Federalism and Ethnicity? Trends in Southeast Asia, 2016,3. Singapore: ISEAS-
Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016. 
Thawnghmung, Ardeth. “The Myanmar Elections 2015: Why the National League for 
Democracy Won a Landslide Victory.” Critical Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (January 
2, 2016): 132–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2015.1134929. 
“Timeline: China-Myanmar Relations.” The Irrawaddy, November 25, 2017. 
https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/timeline-china-myanmar-relations.html. 
“Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine.” Rakhine 
Commision (blog). Accessed November 13, 2017. 
http://www.rakhinecommission.org/the-final-report/. 
Turnell, Sean. “Myanmar in 2010: Doors Open, Doors Close.” Asian Survey 51, no. 1 
(2011): 148–54. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.148. 
———. “Myanmar in 2011: Confounding Expectations.” Asian Survey 52, no. 1 (2012): 
157–64. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.1.157. 
Wilson, Trevor. “Strategic Choices in Myanmar’s Transition and Myanmar’s National 
Security Policies.” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 
62–71. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.117. 
———. “What Can the World Do for the Rohingya?” New Mandala, October 20, 2017. 
http://www.newmandala.org/historical-realities-rohingya/. 
Win, U Khin Maung. “Burma Today News.” Burma Today, January 28, 2004. 
 79 




 Zin, Min. “The New Configuration of Power.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 2 (April 
15, 2016): 116–31. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0032. 
  
 80 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
